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THE FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM: IS 
THERE A LAWYER CAST OF MIND? LESSONS FROM 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
Robert Eli Rosen,* Christine E. Parker,** & Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen*** † 
ABSTRACT 
Professionals working inside companies may bring with them 
frames of mind set by their professional experience and socialization.  
Lawyers, in particular, are said to “think like a lawyer”—to have a 
lawyer cast of mind.  In seeking power within a company and in 
exercising the power that they obtain, professionals may draw on 
their professional background to frame, name, diagnose, and 
prescribe a remedy for the company’s problems.  In making decisions 
about their compliance with the law, companies are constrained not 
only by their environment, but also by their agents’ understanding of 
whose (or what) interests the company should serve.  In particular, 
compliance managers’ understandings will frame and influence their 
companies’ calculations of the value, benefits, and costs of 
compliance activities.  The profession of the compliance manager 
then may influence how the company complies with the law.  This 
Article uses data from a survey of 999 large Australian businesses to 
examine the professional background of the person in charge of 
compliance and (1) how they analyze the costs, benefits and risks of 
non-compliance; and (2) their company’s structures and practices of 
compliance.  Contrary to our hypotheses, we find that the 
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professional background of the individual responsible for compliance 
has little impact on a company’s compliance management structures 
and practices or assessment of stakeholders.  The exceptions are that 
having a lawyer in charge of compliance is associated with the 
company’s perception of heightened legal risk; and where the person 
in charge of compliance is a lawyer, the company compliance efforts 
will be marked by manuals and training programs, but not more 
fulsome compliance structures, which are present when a compliance 
specialist leads the department.  Unfortunately, our data also reveals 
that these compliance structures are generally merely formal—and 
likely largely symbolic.   
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 299 
  I.  Julius Henry Cohen and the Lawyer Cast of Mind ...................... 303 
  II.  Professional Frames’ Influence on Business Behaviors.............. 307 
  III.  Our Study ....................................................................................... 317 
A. Outline of Analytic Model/Hypotheses .............................. 317 
B. Data and Research Strategy ................................................ 322 
1. Data ................................................................................... 322 
2. Research Strategy ............................................................ 324 
3. Measures ........................................................................... 326 
4. Testing Hypothesis 1: Compliance Behavior of 
Respondent’s Company .................................................. 327 
5. Testing Hypothesis 2: Respondent Company’s Risk 
Analyses ........................................................................... 332 
6. Main Independent Variable ........................................... 336 
7. Control Variables ............................................................ 337 
a. The Firm’s History .................................................... 337 
b. Firm-Level Factors ................................................... 339 
  IV.  Results ............................................................................................. 342 
A. Hypothesis 1: Direct Effects of Professional 
Orientation on Compliance Management Behaviors ....... 345 
B. Hypothesis 2: Indirect Effect of Profession on Risk 
Analyses ................................................................................. 348 
  V.  Discussion/Conclusion .................................................................... 352 
A. Summary of Results .............................................................. 352 
B. Limitations of Study .............................................................. 355 
C. Firm Identity and the Profession of the Person in 
Charge of  Compliance ......................................................... 357 
D. Firm Norms and Professional Behavior ............................. 359 
E. The Two Faces of Lawyers ................................................... 362 
Conclusion—Back to Julius Henry Cohen ........................................... 364 
ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:48 PM 
2012] FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM 299 
 
The mind of the lawyer is the essential part of the machinery of 
justice . . . .  The progress of the law means the progress of the 
lawyer, not of a few talented men who are on the outposts of legal 
thought, but the great army of the commonplace . . . .1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An inveterate tradition in thinking about the legal profession is to 
ascribe to lawyers a “cast of mind.”2  “Thinking like a lawyer” 
supposedly names a peculiar mode of both analysis and response.3  
The “great army” of lawyers is said to have “[t]he mind of the 
lawyer.”4 
Experience, socialization, and education in particular, are thought 
to construct the lawyer cast of mind.5  By performing law jobs, such as 
 
 1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 317–18 (1916) 
(quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, Report of the Committee on Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar, in REPORT OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 365 (1897)). 
 2. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (1988) (discussing de Tocqueville).  The use of “mind” is 
definitely not intended to exclude emotions or psychological characteristics.  
Tocqueville was discussing “mores,” sometimes translated as “habits of the heart.” 
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 36-41 (1996); see also Luban, supra, at 721 
(discussing Brandeis). 
 3. The concept of “thinking like a lawyer,” like that of a lawyerly cast of mind, is 
a capacious one.  We do not believe that there is a single definition of either of these 
concepts.  Like “profession” itself, they are “folk concepts.” See ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY & POLICY 20 (1994).  The status of 
“thinking like a lawyer” as a folk concept is testified to by the number of quite 
different books with this exact phrase in their title. See, e.g., PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, 
A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2001); 
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOLS: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” (2007); SARAH E. REDFIELD, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN EDUCATOR’S 
GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH (2011); FRED SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE 
A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009); THINKING LIKE A 
LAWYER: ESSAYS ON LEGAL HISTORY AND GENERAL HISTORY FOR JOHN CROOK ON 
HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY (J.A. Crook & Paul McKechnie eds., 2002); KENNETH J. 
VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
(1996).  These are only some of the most recent examples available in print. 
 4. COHEN, supra note 1, at 317. 
 5. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004).  On the experience of 
Australian law schools and their connection with the hierarchy of the legal 
profession, see Christine Parker & Andrew Goldsmith, ‘Failed Sociologists’ in the 
Marketplace: Law Schools in Australia, 25 J.L. SOC’Y 33 (1998), simultaneously 
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drafting documents or appearing before tribunals, lawyers may 
develop habits of heart and mind.  Some of these are characteristic of 
all fiduciaries, such as careful work, anticipation of risks, and 
unselfish devotion.6  Others are characteristic of the legal profession, 
such as unquestioning loyalty, partisanship, and the ability to 
challenge authority with respect.7  Yet others may be less ennobling, 
such as being adversarial, critical, closed, mono-disciplinary, 
aggressive, or arrogantly independent.8  There may be arguments 
about what character traits are taught, or how to teach them—
especially given divergent moral and political values—but there is 
little controversy that legal practice and education develop “thinking 
like a lawyer.” 
The framing effects of “thinking like a lawyer” may be understood 
as an instance of the more general framing effects of professionalism.  
Professional role and background as consequential for behavior has 
been argued for by Berle & Means,9 Neil Fligstein,10 Herbert Simon,11 
Amos Tversky,12 and many others.13 
Their work suggests that professional framing operates even 
outside what may be seen as the profession’s “jurisdiction.”14  
Lawyers, for example, may prefer acquisitive, rather than internal 
diversification, strategies when they become CEOs.15  Or, they may 
spend less on Research and Development (R&D) than CEOs with 
 
published in TRANSFORMATIVE VISIONS OF LEGAL EDUCATION 33 (Anthony 
Bradney & Fiona Cownie eds., 1998). See also MARGARET THORNTON, PRIVATISING 
THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE CASE OF LAW (2012). 
 6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01, 8.08 (2006). 
 7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 3.4, 8.4 (2012). 
 8. Michele DeStefano suggested we prominently include these characteristics as 
well as the more virtuous ones.  We thank her. 
 9. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 14. To adopt Andrew Abbott’s term for the field of a particular profession’s 
analysis and action, see ANDREW ABBOTT, SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON 
THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 53–57 (1988). 
 15. Jae H. Song, Diversification Strategies and the Experience of Top Executives 
of Large Firms, 3 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 377 (1982) (internal diversification was 
favored by CEOs with marketing background; acquisitive diversification was favored 
by CEOs with backgrounds in finance, accounting, and law). 
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other backgrounds.16  Social fields, like the economy or the family, are 
sometimes “legalized,” which occurs when legal professionals reorder 
aspects of a social field by successfully applying legal forms, concepts, 
and imaginings outside a traditional legal arena (normally thereby 
creating jobs for the legally trained).17  Legalization, however, is 
(fortunately) not always successful: The power of thinking like a 
lawyer may or may not support lawyers as they move into jobs 
outside what has heretofore been considered “legal.”  Or, only 
aspects of thinking like a lawyer may travel with the lawyer. 
This Article inquires into the framing effects of professionalism on 
organizational compliance structures and practices, with particular 
attention to the distinctive influence, if any, of the lawyer cast of 
mind.  We ask: When lawyers are compliance managers, do 
companies’ structures and practices of compliance differ from when a 
chief financial officer or specialized compliance professional, 
company secretary, or chief executive officer is the manager of 
compliance?  We use survey data to measure the framing effects of 
professionalism and the distinctiveness of the lawyer cast of mind on 
compliance structures and practices. 
Self-introspective writing on “the lawyer cast of mind” and 
“thinking like a lawyer” is vast.  This Article appears in a special issue 
of the Fordham Urban Law Journal inspired by the work of Julius 
Henry Cohen.  Part One of the Article uses his work to discuss the 
lawyer cast of mind.  Part Two of the Article provides a brief 
literature review about the influence on business behavior of the 
professional background of managers.  
In Part Three, we develop and present a theoretical model for 
research.  We then test this model using our data from 999 large 
Australian businesses.  Our data includes many lawyers and other 
professionals who manage their organizations’ compliance structures 
and practices.  Contrary to our hypotheses, we find that the 
professional background of the individual responsible for compliance 
has little impact on a company’s compliance management structures 
and practices or assessment of compliance risks.  The exceptions are 
that having a lawyer in charge of compliance is associated with the 
 
 16. Vincent L. Barker, III & George C. Mueller, CEO Characteristics and Firm 
R&D Spending, 48 MGMT. SCI. 782, 797 (2002) (“CEOs with legal career experience 
spend less on R&D than CEOs without such experience.”) 
 17. See, e.g., FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY POLICY IN THE NEW EUROPE (Jacek 
Kurczewski & Mavis Maclean eds., 1997); THE IMPOSITION OF LAW (Sandra B. 
Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 1979). 
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company’s perception of heightened legal risk; and where the person 
in charge of compliance is a lawyer, the company compliance efforts 
will be marked by manuals and training programs, but not more 
fulsome compliance structures, which are present when the 
department is headed by a compliance specialist.  After presenting 
our data, we consider its significance and limitations. 
Currently, there is a contest among professions about jurisdiction 
over compliance systems18: Who should lead them?  In the United 
States, we are seeing Chief Compliance Officer positions emerge, 
often out of and separating from the legal department.19  For some, 
this divorce is a happy event, as the role of “cop” is removed from the 
legal department.20  For others, this is a reduction in the lawyer role 
and they seek to resist it.  Our research took place in Australia at a 
time when there was no consensus as to who should be in charge of 
the compliance systems that we examined.  This makes our study an 
excellent one for seeing whether and how the lawyer cast of mind is 
put in play compared with other professional frames. 
It is not only students of the professions who can benefit from a 
better understanding of the role of professionals in compliance 
programs.  There is a great deal of policy and research interest in how 
companies respond to the threat of external regulation and regulatory 
enforcement by putting in place internal controls (compliance 
systems).21  The development of company compliance and risk 
management structures has been the focus of legislative, judicial, and 
private regulatory initiatives.22  In the United States, the presumed 
 
 18. “To an outside observer there is a strong scent of professional competition” 
between lawyers and non-lawyers as to who should be the “chief ethics and 
compliance officers.” Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house 
Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012); 
see also ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 103 (Quid 
Pro Books 2010) (1984); Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory 
Compliance: Autonomy or Interdependence?, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 339 (2000); Robert 
Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of 
QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Diffusion] (lawyers 
and board in competition). 
 19. Michele DeStefano, The Government’s Unofficial Stance on Compliance 
Departments: To Comply or Not to Comply (draft on file with authors). 
 20. Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 457, 463–64 (2000) (describing inside counsel as playing a “cop” role). 
 21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 22. See THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (Radu Mares ed., 2011); Cary Coglianese & 
David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
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ability of the chief compliance officer to direct corporate behavior is 
the basis for individual liability23 and for the strategy of the 
regulator.24   
Providing corporate leadership opportunities to professionals has 
been a mechanism that some have hoped would make corporations 
more responsible.25  Their professional skills would make them better 
sensors of environmental influences and their professional 
commitments would make them lead the corporation to valuing 
compliance.26  Either their socialization or their career interests would 
lead them to be carriers of professional norms inside the 
corporation.27  As employees, they would make the corporation more 
permeable to regulation.28  In the conclusion, we return to this hope. 
I.  JULIUS HENRY COHEN AND THE LAWYER CAST OF MIND 
Understood functionally, the lawyer cast of mind has various 
aspects.  First, it is normative control: it constructs what is virtue and 
vice for a lawyer.  Second, it creates identity: it unites and separates 
lawyers.  Third, it forges jurisdictions: it maintains, gains, and declines 
work for the profession.  And fourth, it establishes traditions: it 
speaks one set of public discourses and silences others.29 
Although there are traditions in which being “like a lawyer” is 
condemned and there are those which mark lawyers as the butts of 
jokes, there also is a tradition that equates the lawyer cast of mind 
with virtuous action.  Julius Henry Cohen is in that tradition.  For 
 
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, 
The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 267, 277–82 (2004); Sharon Gilad, It Runs in the Family: Meta-
Regulation and Its Siblings, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 485 (2010). 
 23. See Anthony Pirraglia, Note, Tangled Web: Compliance Director Liability 
Under the Securities Laws, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245, 268 (2003). 
 24. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 
464 (2006) (quoting SEC official). 
 25. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-
REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 168–96 (2002). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN 
WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 15 (Maureen Cain & Christine 
Harrington eds., 1994); Timothy Kuhn, Positioning Lawyers: Discursive Resources, 
Professional Ethics and Identification, 16 ORGANIZATION 681 (2009); Christine 
Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global Capital, and the Sociological 
Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347 (2012). 
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Cohen, the cause and consequence of becoming a lawyer is the lawyer 
cast of mind, which frames a lawyer’s motives and actions and aligns 
them with ethics.  In Cohen’s day, admitting immigrants (often Jewish 
and Catholic) to the legal profession was at issue.  Cohen supported 
the admission of immigrants to the profession on the ground that 
legal education socialized them into thinking like an “American” (i.e., 
non-immigrant) lawyer: “[T]he passage through the universities and 
the law schools . . . shows clearly that these obstacles [of poor 
socialization] are overcome . . . .”30   
To Cohen, a lawyer’s identity—that lawyer’s cast of mind—is an 
acquired virtue, and consequently the profession of law can be 
accessed by all.  The existence of a virtuous lawyer cast of mind 
enabled Julius Henry Cohen to implicate democratic values into the 
profession: Immigrants could become lawyers and they could join 
with non-immigrants to be forces for justice because they learned to 
think (and consequently feel) alike.31  However, because it is an 
acquired virtue, guardians of the profession are needed and they must 
be eternally vigilant to preserve the lawyer cast of mind since what 
can be acquired can also be lost or misshapen.32  Julius Henry Cohen 
was one of those guardians. 
A contrary view is that virtue and good character are traits that are 
developed outside of legal training33:  Who one is, not the lawyer cast 
of mind one has been educated into, informs ethical choices in legal 
practice.  And passing tests on professionalism bears little relation to 
behavior in practice.34  Legal practice then needs to be limited to good 
men.35  Character and fitness committees should be emboldened to 
guard against miscreants entering the profession.  The weakness of 
this view stems from the legendary difficulties of assessing good 
 
 30. Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the 
Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth 
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 15 (2005) (quoting COHEN, 
supra note 1, at 317).  Hence, “Cohen identified higher standards of admission to the 
bar as one of the central aspects of his vision of law as a profession . . . .” Levine, 
supra, at 7 n.32. 
 31. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Levine, supra note 30, at 22. 
 33. See generally id. 
 34. See id. at 22 nn.31–32. 
 35. And women need not apply.  For a survey of the historical record, see 
generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1993); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, 
Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Assessing 
Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 733 (2001) (detailing barriers to 
the entry of women into the legal profession). 
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character.  Secondary judgments substitute for primary ones: class, 
race, national origin and ethnic background are taken to indicate 
character.  Democratic admission policies are then understood to 
threaten professionalism.36  Cohen’s response is that this threat can be 
met by the lawyer cast of mind and protecting it by vigilantly 
imposing strictures on how lawyers behave, maintaining the 
“dignity”37 of the lawyer office, disciplining wayward lawyers, and 
regulating law schools.38 
The lawyer cast of mind to Cohen does not only support diversity 
in membership in the legal profession, but also makes possible 
common cause between lawyers.39  Despite the sociological reality 
that lawyers on Wall Street, on Main Street, and on Tally’s Corner 
have little in common except a professional degree, the conception of 
thinking like a lawyer creates a common bond between them.  It is 
noteworthy, despite its usage being much more common in his day 
than in ours, that Cohen repeatedly speaks to “we” lawyers.40  He 
addresses his fellow American lawyers, telling them what “we know” 
and that the lawyers’ fellow citizens “call upon us to discipline, to 
educate.”41  Speaking to “we” is an assertion of power and it 
challenges “we” to exercise power.42  Now that U.S. lawyers are more 
than a million strong, Cohen’s vision of speaking to “we” lawyers 
invites speculation about political mobilizations “of the great army” 
 
 36. See Levine, supra note 30, at 7. 
 37. See id. at 28 (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 313). 
 38. See id. at 22. 
 39. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 318. 
 40. See Levine, supra note 30, at 22 (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 258-59).  As 
Levine makes clear, Cohen uses “we” not to exclude others or to affirm a social 
position—Cohen espouses neither nativist nor Christian superiority—but he uses 
“we” to include himself and all lawyers and to deny the particularities of his social 
position. See id. at 13. 
 41. See id. at 22; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at xiv (“We lawyers must be 
reminded over and over again that we are living in a democracy.”).  Cohen makes use 
of the “Royal We,” instead of an “I” at many points in the book. See, e.g., id. at 1–2.  
But, he also uses it to create identity between himself and the reader.  For example, 
the first line of the chapter on “Officer of the Court” is “We are an insular people at 
best.” Id. at 44.  Cohen concludes his argument with, “We begin now to understand . . 
. the Russian immigrant.” Id. at 74.  Or, “We have had, it is true, individual lawyers of 
great distinction. . . .  Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, Jefferson.” Id. at 104. 
 42. The right to say “we” is the central theme of Rubashov’s questioning in 
Arthur Koestler’s DARKNESS AT NOON. See ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT 
NOON 78–94 (1941). 
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not yet taken.43  To Cohen “we” lawyers emerges, with their national 
responsibilities and possibilities, because all lawyers have a certain 
cast of mind.  That is, Cohen was making an empirical assertion that 
lawyers share a political vision because they share a cast of mind. 
The lawyer cast of mind also allows the profession to occupy 
“jurisdictions.”  It is not just individual lawyers who find work outside 
the traditional professional preserve, but new tasks and jobs become 
allocated to lawyers as a result of collective mobilization projects, 
including the organized bar fighting other occupations for jurisdiction 
over work.44  The division of labor between professions, in part, is a 
form of “intentional social architecture” based on claims of 
knowledge to solve problems.45  “Thinking like a lawyer” is 
sufficiently abstract that it allows the legal profession to “redefine its 
problems and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new 
problems.”46  It is sufficiently concrete that it also enables remedies to 
these problems and tasks. 
In fighting against multi-disciplinary practices (MDPs), the ABA is 
engaged in patrolling the borders of the legal profession’s jurisdiction.  
Recent fighting is based on the effects such practices would have on 
“thinking like a lawyer.”47  In other places, there has been more of a 
blurring of professional boundaries and less call for a monopoly 
defined by the lawyer cast of mind.  In the United States, some 
corporate work has been outsourced to non-lawyers.48  In the United 
Kingdom, the conveyancing monopoly is a thing of the past.  In the 
United Kingdom and Australia, non-lawyers are allowed to own stock 
 
 43. COHEN, supra note 1, at 318.  In questioning the singular nature of the legal 
profession and its cast of mind, we question the vision of an army of lawyers capable 
of being mobilized for this or that end. 
 44. See ABBOTT, supra note 14, at 86–91.  For applications of this concept to the 
legal profession, see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN 
VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) and RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL 
UNCERTAINTY (1995). 
 45. See DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, POWER AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 19 
(1986). 
 46. See ABBOTT, supra note 14, at 9. 
 47. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of 
Purchasing Legal Services From Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the 
Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on 
the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000). 
 48. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and 
Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2137, 2164 (2010). 
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in law firms, despite claims about the ill-effects on the lawyer cast of 
mind.49  Today, as a matter of professional defense, as well as to 
secure new tasks, such as compliance, mere recitals about a vague 
lawyer cast of mind are insufficient. 
There is not much empirical work on whether or not there is a 
lawyer cast of mind.  It has been more or less assumed that there is 
one and the debate is only about its valences.  Not all agree with 
Cohen about its link to virtue.  Some suggest, e.g., that lawyers are 
overly aggressive.50  Nor do all agree that it is the distinctive voice of 
the legal profession.  Nor do all agree with its attempted silencing of 
other traditions and approaches within the profession’s claimed 
jurisdictions. 
In the next Part, we survey relevant research on how the 
professional backgrounds of managers and executives shape company 
behavior.  The findings of that literature point in multiple directions, 
raising questions about whether legal education and practice actually 
create a cast of mind, or at least whether it creates a cast of mind that 
travels with lawyers to business.  Our research reveals what aspects of 
the lawyer cast of mind survive when lawyer jurisdiction is extended 
into compliance programs. 
II.  PROFESSIONAL FRAMES’ INFLUENCE ON BUSINESS 
BEHAVIORS 
Researchers have studied the effects of many demographic 
variables on the behavior of corporate actors, but professional or 
functional background “is the most widely cited demographic 
characteristic thought to affect corporate strategy.”51  That managers 
would bring their professional attitudes and values to their work was 
recognized by Berle and Means who argued that the separation of 
 
 49. See Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195–232 (2010); John Flood, The Re-Landscaping of the Legal 
Profession: Large Law Firms and Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 
507–29 (2011); Christine Parker, An Opportunity for the Ethical Maturation of the 
Law Firm: The Ethical Implications of Incorporated and Listed Law Firms, in RE-
AFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS 96–108 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); Christine 
Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethical Infrastructure: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Management-Based Regulation of 
Legal Practices, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466, 467 (2010). 
 50. See, e.g., Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and 
Alternatives, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 933, 937–39 (1989). 
 51. Michael Jensen & Edward J. Zajac, Corporate Elites and Corporate Strategy: 
How Demographic Preferences and Structural Position Shape the Scope of the Firm, 
25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 507, 509 (2004). 
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ownership and control allowed managers to pursue “prestige, power, 
or the gratification of professional zeal.”52  More recently, Neil 
Fligstein thought it self-evident that “having spent careers analyzing 
business problems in a certain way, managers come to view all 
problems through a certain theoretical lens.”53  
In a 1958 article, Herbert A. Simon found that a manager’s current 
job led him to perceive and interpret information differently from 
those holding other jobs.54  He argued that functional background 
leads to selective perception and consequently particular diagnoses 
and remedies.55  In a 1991 article, Amos Tversky found that attitudes 
toward risk vary by expertise regarding the context of a decision.56  
Others have suggested that socialization and practice shape behavior 
because they forge subcultures57 and identities.58  Others argue that 
professional and functional backgrounds change people’s values and 
that professional framing is normatively consequential, not merely 
perceptual.59 
 
 52. Adolf Berle & Gardner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 122 (1932) (emphasis added). 
 53. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 357 (1990) 
(not citing any data). 
 54. Dewitt C. Dearborn & Herbert A. Simon, Selective Perception: A Note on 
the Department Identifications of Executives, 21 SOCIOMETRY 140 (1958). 
 55. Id. at 141–43 (citing that a functional background leads general managers to 
perceive and interpret information to reinforce their functional orientation).  As 
Gunz and Jalland point out, some authors have ignored that Dearborn and Simon do 
not describe functional background, rather “the independent variable was the 
manager’s current job and not his or her previous work history.” Hugh P. Gunz & R. 
Michael Jalland, Managerial Careers and Business Strategies, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
718, 734 (1996).  Our data is similar to Dearborn and Simon’s.  We both infer 
background from current jobs.  In our case, except for compliance experts, it is the 
job they hold in addition to being the compliance manager. 
 56. See Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and 
Competence in Choice Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1991). 
 57. On predicting behavior from membership in a “subculture,” see George A. 
Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 
Q.J. ECON. 599 (1976) and George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and 
Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 (2000) (cited in Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1510 (2005)). 
 58. Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its 
Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 606 (2004) (elaborating relations of norms and 
identity). 
 59. Barker & Mueller, supra note 16.  Barker and Mueller argue that it is not that 
functional background creates biased perceptions which in turn explains performance 
differences but that functional background generates “different value preferences. . . .  
Therefore, CEOs with technical or marketing career experience may believe that 
spending money on R&D is just the ‘right thing to do . . . .’” Id. at 797.  Tyler & 
Steensma argued that technical careers and educations teach people to personally 
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According to such research, by framing the decision, professional 
backgrounds define what is relevant, provide technologies of thought 
and socialize normative vision.  Perceiving that they have relevant 
expertise, professionals also perceive reduced ambiguity and 
uncertainty in confronting issue identification, information search and 
processing, risk management, and remedy prescription.60  They suffer 
from Veblen’s “trained incapacities.”61  Today, Veblen’s argument 
would be cast in the tones of cognitive psychology, which famously 
describes decision-makers as myopic and egocentric, attuned to their 
own payoffs, discounting others’ perspectives62: one could 
characterize such an individual as “the selfish professional.”  This 
emphasis on incapacity, it is worth noting, does not legitimize a 
professional’s authority.  It also does not help a profession win a 
battle for jurisdiction to solve particular problems. 
Another line of research has abstracted from individual professions 
and grouped them by functions for the company, describing mind-sets 
based on either “output” or “throughput” experiences.63  By 
 
value innovation. See Beverley B. Tyler & H. Kevin Steensma, The Effects of 
Executives’ Experiences and Perceptions on Their Assessment of Potential 
Technological Alliances, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 939 (1998); cf. James P. Walsh, 
Selectivity and Selective Perception: An Investigation of Managers’ Belief Structures 
and Information Processing, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 873, 887-88 (1988). 
 60. See Anil K. Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, Business Unit Strategy, Managerial 
Characteristics, and Business Unit Effectiveness at Strategy Implementation, 27 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 25, 36 (1984) (explaining that experience in marketing and sales 
equips executives for increased ambiguity and lack of control); Tyler & Steensma, 
supra note 59, at 944 (noting that engineering and technology as primary work 
experience led executives to perceive greater opportunities and fewer risks in 
technological alliances). 
 61. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
ARTS 347 (1914). 
What men can do easily is what they do habitually, and this decides what 
they can think and know easily.  They feel at home in the range of ideas 
which is familiar through their everyday line of action.  A habitual line of 
action constitutes a habitual line of thought, and gives the point of view 
from which facts and events are apprehended and reduced to a body of 
knowledge.  What is consistent with the habitual course of action is 
consistent with the habitual line of thought, and gives the definitive ground 
of knowledge as well as the conventional standard of complacency or 
approval in any community. 
Id. at 195. 
 62. See, e.g., John S. Carroll, Max H. Bazerman & Robin Maury, Negotiator 
Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators’ Understanding of Their 
Opponents, 41 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 352 
(1988). 
 63. See Donald. C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The 
Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193, 199 
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differentiating department managers and CEOs by whether their 
background was in an output function, such as those that relate to 
sales (such as advertising and product development), or in a 
throughput function, that relates to intra-organizational processes 
(such as law and accounting), research found significant differences in 
company behavior, such as diversification strategies.  In particular, 
this research suggests that the functional background of a compliance 
officer matters: 
[O]rganizations can improve their social performance through 
the proactive promotion and recruiting of executives with 
experience in environmental scanning.  Managers with output 
oriented backgrounds may be more sensitive to external 
perceptions and therefore, perhaps more responsive to 
problems that might jeopardize the perception of the 
organization by its stakeholders.  For example, Johnson and 
Johnson’s timely response to the incidents of product 
tampering, was largely credited to its experienced, market 
oriented CEO.  In contrast, managers with internally oriented 
backgrounds [throughput functions] probably focus on 
process and efficiency issues to a greater extent than social 
issues.64 
Other research uses organizational position, which often is linked 
to professional background, to explain firm behavior.  For example, 
Delmas and Toffel describe legal and marketing departments 
providing different “access points to institutional pressures” on 
organizations and that this will influence managers’ sensitivity and 
responses to different institutional pressures.65  Others study the 
 
(1984).  The article suggests dividing managers into those with significant experience 
in output functions, such as product R&D, engineering, entrepreneurship, marketing, 
and sales, which are externally-oriented activities that emphasize growth through 
development of new products and markets, and in throughput functions, such as 
process R&D, accounting, finance, production, administration, and legal, which focus 
on improving the efficiency of the organization and transform inputs into outputs. Id.  
All of our respondents have a background with throughput functions, with the 
exceptions of some CEOs who may have risen out of output functions.  According to 
Hambrick and Mason, then, we should not expect to find any differences between 
our respondents.  But it also is difficult to see legal experts in compliance as in a 
throughput function as their orientation is to external regulation and lawsuits. 
 64. Anisya S. Thomas & Roy L. Simerly, Internal Determinants of Corporate 
Social Performance: The Role of Top Managers, 1995 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 411, 414 
(1995) (finding that CEOs and top management teams have independent influence 
on corporate social performance and that the greater the internal orientation of the 
team, the lower the corporate social performance). 
 65. See Magali A. Delmas & Michael W. Toffel, Organizational Responses to 
Environmental Demands: Opening the Black Box, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1027, 
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occupational or educational background of the Board to predict firm 
behavior.66 
Weber distinguishes between the authority that derives from 
incumbency in an organizational office and the authority that derives 
from being ascribed superior expertise.67  Our respondents have both.  
Our hypothesis is that they will use the authority of their office to 
behave in professionally-biased ways.  It assumes that the 
maintenance of their office, and possibly its attainment, stem from 
their expertise-biased authority. 
Although it may seem self-evident that there is a lawyer cast of 
mind and that managers with different professional backgrounds view 
problems differently, the evidence for this proposition is mixed.  
Some have found effects of professional background on 
organizational behavior.68  And others have not.69  This might reveal 
 
1030 (2008); see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: 
The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 48–49 (1992); 
Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity 
Management: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. 
BEHAV. SCI. 960 (1998); John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of 
Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. 
SOC. REV. 794, 795 (1996). 
 66. For a recent example of this literature, see Scott G. Johnson, Karen 
Schnatterly & Aaron D. Hill, Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social 
Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics, 39 J. MGMT. 232 (2013), available at 
http://jom.sagepub.com/content/39/1/232.full.pdf.  For other examples of what is a 
voluminous literature on boards, see A. Burak Guner, Ulrike Malmendier & 
Geoffrey Alan Tate, The Impact of Boards with Financial Expertise on Corporate 
Policies (NBER Working Paper W11914, 2006) (finding effects when commercial 
bankers and finance professors join Board) and Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. 
Milliken, Cognition and Corporate: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic 
Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494–95 (1999). 
 67. See MAX WEBER, Legal Authority: The Pure Type with Employment of a 
Bureaucratic Administrative Staff, in THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION 329–36 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1947). 
 68. See, e.g., Rajeswararao Chaganti & Rakesh Sambharya, Strategic Orientation 
and Characteristics of Upper Management, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 393 (1987) 
(finding that fewer executives with finance backgrounds and more executives with 
production and R&D backgrounds resulted in firm following product innovation 
strategy); Urs S. Daellenbach, Anne M. McCarthy & Timothy S. Schoenecker, 
Commitment to Innovation: The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics, 
29 R&D MGMT. 199 (1999) (discussing higher R&D spending associated with CEO 
background in technical work); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition 
and Corporate: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making 
Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494–95 (1999); Vijay Govindarajan, 
Implementing Competitive Strategies at the Business Unit Level: Implications of 
Matching Managers to Strategies, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 251 (1989) (discussing the 
influence of background on firm’s competitive strategy); Pol Herrmann & Deepak K. 
Datta, CEO Successor Characteristics and the Choice of Foreign Market Entry 
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the “complexity of other factors that modify the importance” of 
background.70  For example, weak relations between professional 
background and organizational behavior may be found because 
personality factors are intervening (and sometimes overwhelming) 
factors.  Or professional background may be found to be relevant 
only because it is a proxy for cognitive and social processes.  Indeed, 
some have called for “a moratorium on the use of demographic 
variables as surrogates for psychosocial constructs.”71 
 
Mode: An Empirical Study, 33 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 551 (2002) (finding that 
background was associated with international entry via joint ventures and contractual 
arrangements, as opposed to acquisitions); Michael A. Hitt & Beverly B. Tyler, 
Strategic Decision Models: Integrating Different Perspectives, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 327, 344–45 (1991); Mark I. Miller, Lawyers in Congress: What Difference Does it 
Make?, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1 (1993) (discussing how lawyers behave 
differently from non-lawyers); Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, The 
Changing of the Guard: Top Management Characteristics, Organizational Strain, and 
Antitrust Offending, 13 J. QUANT. CRIM. 373 (1997) (finding CEOs with finance and 
administrative backgrounds more likely to engage in antitrust violations); Mark 
Smith & Michael C. White, Strategy, CEO Specialization, and Succession, 32 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 263 (1987) (discussing the link between a new CEOs functional background 
and diversification strategy); Anisa S. Thomas, Robert J. Litschert & Kannan 
Ramaswamy, The Performance Impact of Strategy-Manager Coalignment: An 
Empirical Examination, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1991) (finding that CEOs with 
marketing, sales, and R&D functional backgrounds favored product and market 
innovation strategies as opposed to accounting/finance, production, administration); 
Mary J. Waller et al., Functional Background as a Determinant of Executives’ 
Selective Perception, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 943, 964–66 (1995); A. Burak Güner, Ulrike 
Malmendier, & Geoffrey Alan Tate, The Impact of Boards with Financial Expertise 
on Corporate Policies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper W11914, 
2006) (finding effects when commercial bankers and finance professors join Board). 
 69. See generally Bradley R. Agle et al., Who Matters to CEOs? An Investigation 
of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience, Corporate Performance, and CEO Values, 
42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 507 (1999); see also Janice M. Beyer et al., The Selective 
Perception of Managers Revisited, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 716, 729 (1997); Marjorie A. 
Lyles, Defining Strategic Problems: Subjective Criteria of Executives, 3 ORG. STUD. 
263, 276 (1987) (finding no relationship between functional background and 
approaches to problem formulation); Waller, supra note 68, at 964; Walsh, supra note 
59, at 887–88 (replication of Dearborn and Simon).  Finkelstein and Hambrick have 
argued that these results may follow from greater cross-functional rotation of 
managers and their broader training, so that it is inappropriate to classify executives 
as having biases from a single functional background (and there is little 
differentiation across firms in their CEOs’ portfolios of human capital). See SYDNEY 
FINKELSTEIN & DONALD C. HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: TOP EXECUTIVES 
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS 95–96 (1996). 
 70. Richard Reed & Margaret Reed, CEO Experience and Diversification 
Strategy Fit, 26 J. MGMT. STUD. 251, 267 (1989). 
 71. Kimberly B. Boal & Robert Hooijberg, Strategic Leadership Research: 
Moving On, 11 LEADERSHIP Q. 515, 523 (2001); see also Barbara S. Lawrence, The 
Black Box of Organizational Demography, 8 ORG. SCI. 1, 20 (1997); Patricia Pitcher 
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Another line of research studies top management teams (rather 
than individuals).  Of particular interest has been the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the functional backgrounds represented on the team; 
the general finding is that heterogeneity is helpful.72  This line of 
research too has been criticized for relying on demographic variables, 
and another set of research has emerged that focuses on the 
psychological processes of team decision-making.73  That research also 
has been criticized for abstracting from individual managers’ 
personality attributes.74 
Research on managers’ professional backgrounds and their 
influence on company behavior replays the debate between Julius 
Henry Cohen and those who opposed increasing the demographic 
heterogeneity of the bar.75  Thus, there are those who believe that 
professions create identities and casts of mind, as did Cohen 
regarding lawyers.  Nevertheless, there are others who believe that 
pre-existing personality attributes and psychological dispositions are 
the relevant explanatory variables for behavior.  There are also 
some—as the summary of the literature above also shows—who 
 
& Anne D. Smith, Top Management Team Heterogeneity: Personality, Power and 
Proxies, 12 ORG. SCI. 1, 15 (2001). 
 72. See Karen A. Bantel & Susan E. Jackson, Top Management and Innovations 
in Banking: Does the Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference?, 10 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 107, 118 (1989) (finding that diversity of functional backgrounds 
of top management teams was associated with organizational innovation); L. Richard 
Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by 
Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. 
PSYCH. 401, 405 (1961); Sumita Raghuram & Raghu Garud, The Vicious and 
Virtuous Facets of Workforce Diversity, in SELECTED RESEARCH ON WORK TEAM 
DIVERSITY 155, 156 (Marian N. Ruderman et al. eds., 1995) (finding that 
heterogeneous teams bring multiple perspectives to tasks and thereby outperform 
homogeneous teams in generating ideas). 
 73. “Over the past decade, researchers have begun downplaying the influence of 
TMT [Top Management Team] demographics on firm performance and increasingly 
focus on the processes underlying TMT decision making such as comprehensiveness, 
consensus, social integration, conflict, and decision speed.” S. Trevis Certo et al., Top 
Management Teams, Strategy and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analytic 
Examination, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 813, 814 (2006) (citations omitted) (analyzing prior 
studies and finding these as the relevant variables). 
 74. For a discussion of various personality factors that have been found to bear a 
relation to implementation of environmental compliance programs, see Esteban 
Fernandez et al., Managers’ Profile in Environmental Strategy: A Review of the 
Literature, 13 CORP. SOC. RESP. ENVTL. MGMT. 261, 265–68 (2006); see generally 
Steven A. Frankforter et al., Determinants of Governance Structure Among 
Companies: A Test of Agency Theory Predictions, 24 INT’L J. MGMT. 454 (2007) 
(uses variety of personality factors to predict CEO behavior). 
 75. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. 
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believe that intrinsic psychological factors are determinative even 
when individuals operate in group settings. 
All sides in this debate agree that managers bring their identity 
with them into business.  The question is “what is brought?”  The 
virtuous lawyer cast of mind, as Cohen describes it, would bring 
values independent from business.  On the other hand, individual and 
social psychology may have more impact on the lawyer outside the 
profession than in it (as is reflected in the view that lawyers in 
business are something less than lawyers).  Confidence about 
knowing which qualities travel with professionals as they become 
managers does not emerge from this literature. 
Various sociologists have opined on what travels with professionals 
to business management.  Institutionalists, like Selznick, would 
understand lawyer psychological and social frames as being tested as 
lawyers lead companies towards their mission76: Lawyers managing 
compliance programs would be led by the company’s mission as they 
lead the company to a more compliant one.  There also are lines of 
research that stress the importance of professional identity in business 
by examining battles for jurisdiction to solve companies’ problems.77  
Larson, for example, would join the professional and the bureaucrat.  
She would find that the ability that “makes the use of discretion 
predictable” travels with the lawyer.78  Although their visions of what 
travels with the professional differ, and so too does their 
understanding of professional power, both depict professionals acting 
within companies in distinctive ways. 
A New Institutional analysis of organizations suggests that a 
company has reasons or pressures that lead it to select a compliance 
manager with a particular occupational and professional 
background.79  Some organizations might respond to these pressures 
 
 76. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (Quid Pro Books 2011) (1957) (including preface by 
Robert Eli Rosen). 
 77. See S. Carmona, M. Ezzamel & F. Gutiérrez, Towards an Institutional 
Analysis of Accounting Change in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville, 25 ACCT. 
HISTORIANS J. 115 (1998); Bruce G. Carruthers, Accounting, Ambiguity, and The 
New Institutionalism, 20 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 313, 320, 325 (1995); Paul J. DiMaggio 
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 (1983). 
 78. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 198 (1977). 
 79. For an early statement of the New Institutionalist position, see THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell 
eds., 1991). 
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and choose the profession of the person in charge of compliance 
mimetically, copying what others do.  In other organizations, 
regardless of efficiency concerns, professionals are hired to 
demonstrate “normative isomorphism,” to signal the company’s 
professed alignment with social/professional norms.80  And some 
organizations may perceive the importance of liberal values in 
choosing which professionals should manage compliance.81   
In all these organizations, the choice of a particular professional to 
lead compliance is indicative of something about the organization 
itself.  A strong institutional account might suggest that pressures are 
relieved by the managerial appointment.  But, it may be that these 
pressures go further and the professional’s cast of mind and its 
influence on organizational behavior are precisely what the firm seeks 
in choosing a leader with a particular professional background for its 
compliance department.  Analysis by the profession of the person in 
charge of compliance would then reveal differences between 
companies. 
Other research focuses very closely on the exchanges between the 
organization and its external environment.82  According to this 
approach, in order to account for why a company might hire a lawyer 
to manage compliance and determine whether the lawyer so hired 
behaves distinctively, we must understand the different 
interdependencies of the company with the environment.  Because a 
company responds to the environment it perceives, compliance 
behavior depends on how legal constraints become meaningful to the 
firm83: “[It] is the firm’s managers who determine which stakeholders 
are salient and therefore will receive management’s attention.”84  And 
often, the organization is not tightly coupled to its environment so 
that: “[O]ne can identify a firm’s stakeholders . . . but managers may 
 
 80. See id.; see also Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational 
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983). 
 81. Cf. Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Global Law-Making: A Sociolegal 
Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009). 
 82. Organizations have collective interpretations of the environment that are 
shaped by managers. See generally Jeffrey D. Ford & David A. Baucus, 
Organizational Adaptation to Performance Downturns: An Interpretation-Based 
Perspective, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366 (1987). 
 83. PARKER, supra note 25, at 57–60. 
 84. Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and 
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 853, 871 (1997). 
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or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly.”85  Managers 
mediate the environment’s influence on company behavior, and they 
determine the organization’s critical contingencies.86  On the other 
hand, although the company is beset by “pragmatic ambiguity,” there 
are interpretive, or hermeneutic, constraints that limit intra-firm 
power struggles and reflect the company’s ties to its environment.87  
Some research finds that many organizations are closely tied to their 
environments and managers have little room for interpretive play.88  
Our research, however, considers a weak and relatively undefined 
compliance arena: there is room for the managers of compliance to 
play. 
In response to its interdependence with the law, personnel or sub-
units may be specially assigned to manage the firm’s response to an 
aspect of its legal environment.89  To attain and maintain intra-
organizational power and influence, managers of compliance have 
incentives to portray the regulatory environment as powerful and 
uncertain, as the company’s strategic contingencies.90  But what aspect 
of the environment will be cast as strategic?  Is there something 
distinctive about the way a lawyer will paint the environment?  We 
hypothesize that the professional background of a manager influences 
how the firm perceives and responds to its legal environment.  For 
example, we hypothesize that a chief executive officer (CEO) would 
find the law to be meaningful to the firm differently than would a 
general counsel.  And we hypothesize that a compliance function 
headed by the chief financial officer (CFO) would perceive and 
respond to the law differently than would one headed by a 
compliance professional. 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See David J. Hickson et al., A Strategic Contingency Theory of 
Intraorganizational Power, 16 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 216, 223 (1971). 
 87. See generally Helene Giroux, It Was Such a Handy Term: Management 
Fashion and Pragmatic Ambiguity, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1227 (2006). See also Jos 
Benders & Kees Van Veen, What’s in a Fashion? Interpretive Viability and 
Management Fashions, 8 ORGANIZATION 33, 37–39 (2001); Sandy Edward Green, Jr., 
A Rhetorical Theory of Diffusion, 29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 653, 663 (2004). 
 88. H.E. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS (1979); P.R. LAWRENCE 
& J.W. LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT: MANAGING DIFFERENTIATION 
AND INTEGRATION (1986). 
 89. See PARKER, supra note 25, at 53–55. 
 90. Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, Compliance Management Systems: 
Structure, Agency and Culture, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES 
TO REGULATION 170–95 (C. Parker & V. Nielsen eds., 2011). 
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If there is a relation between the profession of the manager in 
charge of compliance and company behavior, then professional values 
and ideologies are being carried by the firm.  Professional schools and 
organizations shape professional values and ideologies.  By 
employing professionals as managers, if there is such a relation, then 
the firm becomes open to influences by professional bodies, 
educational institutions, and the collective mobility projects of 
professionals.91  The literature leaves open whether there is such a 
relation between the manager in charge of compliance and company 
behavior. 
III.  OUR STUDY 
A. Outline of Analytic Model and Hypotheses 
Our main hypothesis is that the professional background of the 
manager of the compliance function will be significant for the structure of 
the company’s compliance system and for the company’s compliance 
behaviors.   
Some of the literature just reviewed predicts that our hypothesis will be 
confirmed, but other of the literature does not.  In particular, when a 
lawyer is in charge of compliance, we hypothesize there will be significant 
differences from when others are in charge.  Very little of the literature 
just reviewed concerns lawyers.  Our research took place on largely 
untrodden territory.  Our hypothesis is that we will find differences 
providing evidence that aspects of the lawyer cast of mind operate in the 
company’s management of compliance.  Our research thus will 
demonstrate what many have assumed, including Julius Henry Cohen, 
that legal socialization creates framing effects that lawyers carry with them 
in and out of legal practice.  We have three reasons for this hypothesis: the 
discretionary power of managers, the company’s selection of the 
professional, and the self-serving biases of survey evidence. 
Members of professions have been socialized into, educated by, 
and connected to a professional community.  Thereby they develop 
different forms of analysis, reasoning, and preferred remedies.92  We 
might therefore expect people from different professional or 
occupational backgrounds to have different approaches to managing 
compliance.  They may have different natural taken-for-granted 
reflexes about how to manage compliance issues.  They may have 
 
 91. See id. at 168–96. 
 92. See generally ABBOTT, supra note 14. 
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different values about what the organization’s priorities should be in 
relation to compliance issues and how to value the economic and 
social relationships with the organization’s stakeholders.  They may 
perceive the risk, and indeed the coercive pressure, of the 
organization’s stakeholders in different ways.  They also may value 
differently the policy and managerial choices in governing compliance 
behavior. 
In the face of uncertainties about the goal of compliance, the discovery 
and consequences of non-compliance and the costs of prevention, one 
would expect that “biases” and “heuristics” would emerge to increase the 
efficiency of decision-making.93  Professional expertise supplies such 
cognitive shortcuts.  Members of professions also have commitment 
biases, so that “cognitive conservatism” and “self-serving biases” lead 
them to interpretations that are consistent with and indeed require 
professional expertise.94  At least from a cognitive perspective, then, we 
expect that the manager in charge of compliance will exercise his or her 
discretionary power in a manner that embeds professional norms inside 
the company.  Of course, the consequences of these cognitive frames—
either for efficiency or compliance—are not settled by their professional 
source. 
A second reason that we expect the profession of the person in 
charge of compliance to make a difference focuses not on that 
individual, but on his or her employer.  Firms’ compliance and risk 
management structures are responses to their environment—including 
pressures from stakeholders and the likelihood of regulatory investigation, 
enforcement, and sanction.95  But different firms will not necessarily 
respond to the same combination of environmental pressures in the same 
way: different firms balance or compromise between various stakeholder 
and regulator pressures external to the firm in different ways.96  Firms 
 
 93. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 24, at 411 (discussing cognitive theory in the 
context of regulation). 
 94. See id. at 422–23. 
 95. See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90; Christine Parker & Vibeke L. 
Nielsen, Corporate Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?, 41 
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 3, 6 (2009). 
 96. See, e.g., Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt? How 
Australian Businesses Think About the Costs and Gains of Compliance with the 
Trade Practices Act, 32 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 555 (2008) [hereinafter Parker & 
Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?]; see also PARKER, supra note 25, at 62-83; Vibeke 
Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third Parties Influence Business 
Compliance?, 35 J. LAW & SOC’Y 309 (2008) [hereinafter Nielsen & Parker, Third 
Parties]. 
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have different preferences regarding individual risks and total risk.97  Firms 
frame external pressures differently and they will frame their responses in 
different ways.98  Firms have compliance cultures.99  Regarding compliance 
with legal norms, firms have their own norms. 
One difference in firm compliance structures is in the nature of their 
leadership.  Firm compliance structures can be differentiated by the 
professional background of their leader.  In some firms, the CEO or senior 
managers also manage various types of compliance.  In others, a specialist 
is hired to run a compliance function.  In still others, chief legal officers or 
a member of their staff manages compliance.  And in others, chief 
financial officers or a member of their staff manages compliance.  The 
selection of an agent from a profession to lead compliance may be an 
indicator of the firm’s compliance culture.  It is a company choice about 
what behavior it seeks.  In many cases, the firm seeks to reduce its 
uncertainty and gain legitimacy by incorporating the practices of a 
profession.100 
The frailty of survey evidence is a third reason for expecting the 
professional background of the survey respondent to be significantly 
related to the reported compliance structures and practices.  A survey 
skeptic would be reluctant to accept the responses as being accurate 
reflections of the company.  Rather, the skeptic would focus on the values 
and interests of the respondent.  This leads straight back to the 
professional background of the respondent, now not as determining 
company behavior, but as determining the survey responses.  If they view 
the survey through their professional cast of mind, then self-serving, social 
desirability and uncertainty-reducing biases will induce their responses to 
reflect the normative and cognitive biases of their profession.  Our analysis 
of the surveys then should reveal differences by the professional 
background of the respondents.  In particular, a lawyer respondent who is 
reflecting herself in her answers to our survey, if she had Cohen’s virtuous 
cast of mind, would stress the importance of having a lawyer in charge of 
compliance, depict her company as compliant with the law, imply legal 
aspirations for herself and her company, and take a legalistic approach 
wherever possible, especially in areas of uncertainty. 
 
 
 97. See sources cited supra note 96. 
 98. See sources cited supra note 96. 
 99. See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90. 
 100. See Edelman et al., supra note 65, at 50–51; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal 
Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13 
LAW & POL’Y 73, 74–75 (1991) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity]. 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual  Model 
 
On the basis of the literature and research described above, we 
propose the model (shown in Figure 1) as to how the profession of 
the person responsible for compliance influences the firm’s 
compliance structures and substantive compliance behaviors.  The 
model posits that the professional’s cast of mind directly influences 
how the professional will construct the compliance system and 
practices.  For example, lawyers will construct different compliance 
systems than would those in finance.  “Stakeholders” are the 
individuals and groups who have the ability to sanction firm non-
compliance, either through the withdrawal of esteem,101 or the 
imposition of economic costs.  The model also posits that professions 
 
 101. Cf. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–57 (1997).  The ACCC has neither the resources nor the 
powers to monitor and enforce business compliance with the law on a proactive basis, 
and its enforcement activity is primarily driven by one-off responses to complaints.  
Moreover, at the time of the research the ACCC had powers only to investigate 
potential contraventions and to take alleged offenders to court for the imposition of 
civil (rarely criminal) penalties, injunctions, and other orders.  In the case of a 
“reactive” regulator like the ACCC, the actors with the most frequent and crucial 
regulatory roles are likely to be third parties.  The ACCC usually only investigates 
potential breaches where there has been a complaint by a customer, supplier, or 
competitor, or where a media story makes it obvious that there could be a breach.  
Moreover, since the ACCC does not investigate or take enforcement action in 
relation to most complaints, the only direct experience of “enforcement” that many 
non-compliant businesses are likely to experience is the actions of third parties. 
Profession of Person in 
Charge of Compliance 
Control variables:  
1) Historic 
“stakeholder” 
pressures 
(Stakeholder 
criticism & ACCC 
investigation)  
2) Size  
3) Management 
resources  
4) Management 
competence  
Probability of Loss by 
Detection by Third Party 
Stakeholders and ACCC 
Magnitude of Loss from 
different Stakeholders 
(“Valuing” of Social and 
Economic Relationships) 
(Formal) Compliance 
Management Structures 
and (Substantive) 
Compliance 
Management in Practice 
 
H1
H2 
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differently assess the firm’s environment and the firm’s stakeholders.  
In particular, individuals from different professions will weigh 
differently the monitoring of the firm’s compliance by third parties.  
Lawyers, for example, may weigh the response of legal regulators to 
be more important than the responses of customers, who may be 
more important to business executives.  We expect that the 
professional cast of mind will influence the probability of detection 
assigned to different third parties, and also influence the probabilities 
assigned to losses from detection and the magnitude of such losses.  
These different assessments of third parties will themselves cause 
changes in the compliance structures and practices at the firms.  If the 
professional cast of mind influences how the environment is 
perceived, and how the environment is perceived directly affects 
compliance, then the profession of the person in charge of compliance 
indirectly influences the firm’s compliance structures and behaviors. 
This model generates two main hypotheses about the direct and 
indirect effects of the professional orientation of the person 
responsible for compliance on the way the firm manages compliance, 
respectively.  The two sets of hypotheses are indicated in Figure 1 by 
labeled arrows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Direct Effect of Professional Orientation: 
Reported compliance behaviors will differ between firms who have 
individuals from different professions in charge of compliance. 
  
Hypothesis 1A: The profession of the “individual in charge of 
compliance” will make for differences in the formal compliance 
system elements that they report have been implemented at their 
firm. 
  
Hypothesis 1B: The profession of the “individual in charge of 
compliance” will make for differences in the substantive management 
behaviors aimed at promoting compliance that they report have been 
implemented at their firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Indirect Effect of Professional Orientation: Firms 
with individuals from different professions in charge of compliance 
will be reported to perceive the costs and risks of non-compliance 
differently, which will in turn influence the reported compliance 
management behaviors that are in place. 
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 Hypothesis 2A: The profession of the “individual in charge of 
compliance” will make for differences in the reported concerns about 
the loss of esteem by and economic sanctions from various 
stakeholders if they breach the law. 
 
 Hypothesis 2B: The profession of the “individual in charge of 
compliance” will make for differences in their assessments of the risks 
of (i) stakeholders and (ii) regulators detecting non-compliance. 
 
 Hypothesis 2C: These different analyses of the costs and risks 
of compliance will lead to differences in what formal systems and 
more substantive management behaviors firms have in place to 
promote compliance—so that the profession of the person 
responsible for compliance will have an indirect effect on compliance 
management behaviors. 
 
Of course, the person in charge of compliance is not the only factor 
influencing a firm’s risk analysis and compliance behaviors.  We also 
expect each firm’s history in relation to compliance and its size, 
resources, and managerial competence102 to influence its compliance 
risk analyses and compliance behaviors.  These are our control 
variables. 
We explain the way in which we test these hypotheses and the 
measures we use for each of these concepts in the following section. 
B. Data and Research Strategy 
1. Data 
Our data comes from a quantitative survey of business experience 
of enforcement and compliance in relation to Australia’s national 
competition and consumer protection legislation, the Trade Practices 
Act of 1974 (Cth) (TPA).103  The TPA applies to all Australian 
 
 102. Originally we also controlled for industry, but it had no effect and, therefore, 
for the sake of simplicity we have left it out of our model.  Industry was classified 
according to Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classification, ABS Catalogue No 1292.0, (66-74) (2006) (“ANZSIC”).  
The statistics are on file with the authors. 
 103. For more detail, see Vibeke Nielsen & Christine Parker, The ACCC 
Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings (2005).  Note 
that on January 1, 2011, the TPA was renamed the Competition and Consumer Act 
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businesses and prohibits certain anti-competitive conduct (e.g., price-
fixing, abuse of market power, etc.), unfair trading practices 
(especially misleading and deceptive advertising), non-compliance 
with legislated product safety standards, and unconscionable conduct 
in business dealings.104  The 2,321 largest Australian businesses 
trading in 2004 and readily contactable were identified (through a 
publicly available commercial list, the Dun and Bradstreet list), with 
special efforts made to include all those large businesses that had 
been the target of ACCC enforcement activity in the previous seven 
years, as identified by ACCC Annual Reports.105 
The businesses were surveyed with a mailed self-completion 
questionnaire, and repeated telephone follow-up yielding 999 
responses—a response rate of 43%.106  Our response rate compares 
well with the 35.5% average response rates for similar questionnaire 
research of top management of business.107  The profile of our 
respondents compares well with the profile of the whole list of the 
largest Australian businesses in terms of size and industry.108 
The questionnaire was to be filled in by the most senior person in 
the organization responsible for trade practices compliance, with a 
focus on contacting first the compliance manager, then the in-house 
counsel, the company secretary, the CFO, and, finally, the CEO, in 
that order. Forty-two percent of those who filled out a questionnaire 
 
(Cth).  Since this research and these data predate that change, the legislation is 
referred to throughout as the TPA. 
 104. The concerns of the TPA include those that first attracted U.S. attention to 
the importance of internal controls. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 278–79 
(discussing the antitrust scandals of the 1960s). 
 105. Two hundred seventy-three of the 2,321 businesses surveyed were identified 
in this way. 
 106. This underestimates the actual response rate because we cut 4.3% of the 
responses actually received from the study because those respondents were too small 
(less than 100 employees) for our sample of large businesses.  If we, quite reasonably, 
assume that similarly 4.3% of the entire list of companies surveyed (including non-
respondents) were “too small,” then we would have a response rate of 45%.  For a 
full report of the survey, including the sample and methodology, see Nielsen & 
Parker, supra note 103, at 7–19; see also Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen, The ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project: Explanation of Project 
and Methodology, MELBOURNE L. SCH. CARTEL PROJECT, 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cartel/related-projects/the-australian-competition-
and-consumer-commission-enforcement-and-compliance-project (last updated Dec. 
12, 2012). 
 107. Yehuda Baruch, Response Rate in Academic Studies—A Comparative 
Analysis, 52 HUM. REL. 421, 431 (1999) (reporting that average for that type of 
questionnaire in articles published in high quality management journals is 35.5%). 
 108. See Nielsen & Parker, supra note 103, at 12–13. 
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were CEOs, company secretaries or CFOs, and a further twenty 
percent general counsel or compliance managers.  There were 263 
CFOs, 123 CEOs, and 81 Chief Legal Officers (CLOs) or General 
Counsels.  Eighty-five of the respondents were compliance 
professionals.  Because we did not collect information on graduate 
degrees, we proceed by assuming that the current occupational 
position reflects the individual’s profession.  To the extent this 
assumption is inaccurate, its significance is minimized because current 
occupational position also has significant framing effects that match 
the profession normally associated with the occupational position.109 
 
Table 1. Profession of Respondents 
Profession Number (and percentage) 
Legal or General Counsel 181 (18%) (incl. 81 Chief Legal Officers) 
Business Executive  288 (29%) (incl. CEO=123) 
Finance Officer 316 (32%) (incl. CFO=263) 
Compliance Officer 85 (9%) 
Company Secretary 95 (10%) 
Unknown 34 (3%) 
TOTAL 999 (100%) (34 missing from total sample) 
2. Research Strategy 
To measure the effect of professionalism, we conduct two 
regressions—one including the profession of the individual in charge 
of TPA compliance and one without in order to see what difference, 
if any, it makes.  In other words, we compare the results and 
explanatory power of testing a model that does not include the 
profession of the person responsible for compliance as an 
independent variable with one that does.  This helps us test the extent 
to which professional orientation has an influence on compliance 
management behavior. 
We test our hypotheses in two stages using regression analyses (see 
Tables 10 and 11 explained and discussed below).  Our control 
variables are included in all these regressions. 
First, we test the extent to which the profession of the individual 
who is in charge of TPA compliance makes a direct difference to how 
 
 109. Cognitive structures vary according to current organizational position (where 
you stand depends on where you sit). See Paul S. Goodman, The Measurement of an 
Individual’s Organizational Map, 13 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 246 (1968). 
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he or she reports the way the organization manages TPA compliance 
in terms of implementation of formal compliance systems and 
substantive compliance management behavior (testing Hypotheses 
1A and 1B). 
In the same series of regressions we also test the impacts of the way 
the firm weighs worries about different stakeholder pressures in 
relation to TPA compliance and the way it assesses the risk of 
stakeholder action in relation to TPA compliance (including 
regulatory enforcement action) on compliance management behavior. 
Hypothesis 2C states that the profession of the person responsible for 
compliance should have an indirect effect on compliance 
management behavior by influencing these risk analyses of non-
compliance by the firm.  We need to determine which risk analyses do 
in fact have any effect on compliance management behavior to 
specify our test of Hypotheses 2A and 2B (concerning the influence 
of professional orientation on the firm’s risk analyses) so as not to 
include effects irrelevant to compliance.   
We then test whether the profession of the person responsible for 
compliance has any influence on the way the firm is reported to weigh 
worries about pressures in relation to TPA compliance from different 
stakeholders and the way it assesses the risk of stakeholder pressure.  
In these regressions we test for professional influence only on those 
worries about stakeholders that we found have an influence on 
compliance management behaviors.  As with our other analyses, we 
also conduct two sets of regressions so that we can compare the 
explanatory power of including the profession of the individual in 
charge of TPA compliance and not including the profession of the 
individual in charge.  This helps us to be more confident as to whether 
or not the profession of the person responsible for compliance makes 
any difference.  The measures used are described immediately below 
and the results are described and discussed in the following section. 
The explanatory model has been estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression.  Appropriate visual inspections and 
statistical tests were conducted to verify that OLS regression 
assumptions were met for these models.  To test the robustness of the 
model—and as far as possible exclude the possibility that our findings 
are not simply random experimental effects created by the large 
amount of variables—we use low p-values, making it harder to get 
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significant results.110  We also tested for multicorrelation, and found 
nothing above level of tolerance. 
In each regression we exclude insignificant variables one at a time 
(apart from the profession of the person responsible for compliance 
which is the focus of our model). The final regressions only are 
shown.  That is, the final regressions show only variables for which 
any significant association was found and none for which no 
significant association was found. 
3. Measures 
Each of our measures is based on our respondents’ self-reported 
answers to questions in our surveys.  The wording of each question 
was based on our earlier qualitative and documentary research on the 
nature of ACCC enforcement activities and their impact on business 
compliance,111 as well as theoretical considerations and previous 
studies. 
Self-report measures are particularly useful where the object of 
interest is a perception or attitude.112  Our interest in the lawyer’s cast 
of mind, and different professional orientations, can be elicited by 
self-reports as respondents’ perceptions provide good evidence of 
certain aspects of professional orientation.  Of course, self-reports are 
not merely self-referential.  They do tell us something about the 
firms.  In large business organizations no one person may have 
sufficient knowledge of all parts of the organization or its history to 
be able to answer a survey accurately.  The high rank and position of 
those who actually filled out the questionnaire for each organization 
(see Table 1 above) suggests that we may have succeeded in finding 
the person in the organization best informed about trade practices 
compliance to fill out our questionnaire. 
A more fundamental problem with self-report measures is that 
respondents might show social desirability or other biases that make 
 
 110. We also estimated the model including the most theoretically likely 
interaction variables (between size of company and each different worry).  None of 
these turned out to be significant which is why they were left out of the model in the 
end. 
 111. See CHRISTINE PARKER & NATALIE STEPANENKO, COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT PROJECT: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH REPORT 5–13 (2003). 
 112. Vibeke L. Nielsen & Christine Parker, Mixed Motives: Economic, Social, and 
Normative Motivations in Business Compliance, 34 LAW & POL’Y 428, 438 (2012). 
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it difficult for them to answer questions truthfully.113  Like other 
researchers, we sought to overcome this set of potential reliability 
problems by making (and following through on) strict guarantees of 
confidentiality and anonymity in our handling of the data in order to 
ensure that respondents felt they could safely answer questions 
honestly.  Moreover, to the extent possible, we framed our questions 
as specifically as possible so that it should be relatively easy for the 
person filling out the questionnaire to objectively determine whether 
the answer should be yes or no, eliminating as far as possible the 
element of subjectivity that makes it easier to respond in a socially 
desirable way.  The examples in Table 2 illustrate the types of 
questions we asked.  Nevertheless our results should be interpreted 
bearing in mind that they rely on self-reports only, and that they 
therefore may reflect limited knowledge and the way respondents feel 
they should think and behave.  In the context of the analysis in this 
Article, however, this is, in a sense, a strength.  Although the 
responses may be biased judgments of how their firm behaves, they 
also may be self-servingly biased, reflecting normative conceptions of 
thought and behavior of the respondent’s specific professional 
background. 
 4.Testing Hypothesis 1: Compliance Behavior of Respondent’s 
Company 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we evaluate the extent of influence of 
the type of professional in charge of compliance on two measures of 
compliance management behaviors of the businesses—
implementation of (formal) compliance management systems and the 
(substantive) way compliance is managed in practice.114 
(a) Implementation of formal compliance system elements (Table 
2): The questionnaire asked respondents to provide yes or no answers 
to a series of twenty-one very specific questions about whether their 
organization had implemented various procedures and actions 
 
 113. Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, The Challenge of Empirical Research 
on Business Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45, 62 
(2009). 
 114. For further detail and justification of these measures, and discussion of 
descriptive statistics from these measures, see Nielsen & Parker, supra note 103, at 
30–64; Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance 
Systems Seriously? An Empirical Study of Implementation of Trade Practices 
Compliance Systems in Australia, 30 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 441, 451 (2006) 
[hereinafter Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?]. 
See generally Parker & Nielsen, supra note 95. 
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expected to be part of a good (formal) compliance system.115  The 
questions were later grouped into four different indices measuring the 
implementation of system elements concerning a) complaints 
handling, b) communication and training from the top of the 
organization to employees, c) management accountability and 
whistle-blowing, and d) compliance performance measurement and 
discipline.  We use these four measures to look at four different 
dimensions of compliance system implementation (rather than one 
index of all the items) because businesses will not necessarily 
implement all potential aspects of compliance systems equally.116  On 
the other hand, using these four indices rather than looking at 
variation in each of the twenty-one elements individually gives a 
clearer picture that takes into account the fact that there are different 
ways of performing the different functions of a compliance system.117 
 
Table 2. Measure of Implementation of Four Aspects of (Formal) Compliance 
Systems 
Four Aspects Questions (Yes/No) 
% Answering 
Yes 
(n=958–982) 
Complaints 
Handling 
Mean: 57 
Std.dev.: 24 
Min: 0 
Max: 100 
In my organization there is a clearly defined system for 
 handling complaints from customers/clients; 
91 
In my organization we keep records of complaints from 
 customers, competitors and/or suppliers; 
87 
In my organization there is a clearly defined system for 
 handling compliance failures identified by staff, 
 competitors, suppliers or the ACCC; 
53 
In my organization we actively seek out consumer 
 opinion about new advertising and/or new products; 
40 
In my organization we have a hotline for complaints 
 about our compliance with the TPA. 
13 
 
 115. See PARKER, supra note 25, at 302–11. 
 116. These four indices are treated as formative indices made by adding the score 
for each variable together. The logic behind this is that the more elements the 
business has implemented, the more it is trying to comply.  In contrast to reflective 
indices, we do not necessarily expect interdependence between the variables included 
in the index.  Therefore it makes no sense to test for reliability. 
 117. We also conducted the regression analyses reported below on each of the 
twenty-one measures individually—but found no major difference in the patterns of 
influence from what is reported in this Article: statistics on file with the authors. 
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Commc’n & 
Training 
Mean: 31 
Std. dev.: 33 
Min: 0 
Max: 100 
My organization has a written compliance policy about 
 trade practices compliance; 
45 
In my organization employees are now and then sent to a 
 brush up course on how to comply with the TPA; 
38 
Live training sessions are a part of our training of 
 employees in trade practices compliance; 
34 
In our organization we use a compliance manual in trade 
 practices compliance; 
31 
My organization has a dedicated compliance function 
 taking care of trade practices compliance; 
30 
Induction for new employees includes substantial 
 training in trade practices compliance; 
28 
At least half our employees have attended an employee 
 seminar about the TPA during the last 5 years; 
21 
In my organization we use a computer based training 
 program in trade practices compliance. 
17 
Management 
Accountability 
& Whistle-
blowing 
Mean: 30 
Std. dev.: 30 
Min: 0 
Max: 100 
My organization has written policies to encourage and 
 protect internal whistleblowers; 
43 
In the last 5 years an external consultant has reviewed 
 our compliance system; 
35 
In my organization managers are asked to report 
 regularly on compliance; 
26 
In my organization we have systematic audits by external 
 professionals to check for trade practices breaches. 
17 
Compliance 
Performance 
Measurement & 
Discipline 
Mean: 15 
Std. dev.: 26 
Min: 0 
Max: 100 
Trade practices compliance performance indicators are 
 included in the corporate plan; 
20 
Compliance performance indicators relevant for the 
 TPA are among the individual performance indicators 
 for our employees; 
13 
In my organization in the last 5 years employees have 
 been disciplined for breaching our trade practices 
 compliance policy. 
12 
 
(b) Compliance management in practice (Table 3): Implementation 
of a compliance system is aimed at putting formal structures in place 
that managers and employees can use to identify, prevent and correct 
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compliance.118  This should be helpful in influencing the way activities 
are managed in practice to improve actual compliance.  But it is not 
enough on its own.119  It is possible for an organization to implement 
the various elements of compliance management programs in a 
formulaic, formalistic, or purely symbolic way.120  But the key to a 
compliance management program’s impact on compliance will be the 
impact it has on everyday routines and practices.121  Effective 
compliance management in practice means that management and 
employees identify compliance problems, communicate them to those 
who can fix them, and rectify them as a part of their everyday 
routines and practices.122  The aim of compliance management 
programs is to ensure compliance by improving compliance 
management in practice.  Again we constructed a single measure by 
adding together fourteen questions containing specific statements 
about what business management actually does in order to make sure 
they comply with the TPA (shown in Table 3). 
 
  
 
 118. See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90; Parker & Nielsen, Do 
Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?, supra note 114, at 450–52; Parker & 
Nielsen, supra note 95, at 4. 
 119. See SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 144–
45 (2002); Marie McKendall, Beverly DeMarr & Catherine Jones-Rikkers, Ethical 
Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the 
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 137, 380 (2002); Parker & 
Nielsen, supra note 95, at 27. 
 120. See Sharon Gilad, Institutionalizing Fairness in Financial Markets: Mission 
Impossible?, 5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 309, 309 (2011). 
 121. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3. Management in Practice 
Questions 
Mean Responses for 
Each Question 
(Scale from 1–5 
‘Strongly disagree’ to 
‘Strongly agree’.) 
Whole 
Measure 
In our organization the people responsible for 
 compliance find it easy to get access to top management;
4.10 Cronbach  
Alpha: 0.83 
Mean: 3.51 
n=869–993 
In my organization compliance problems are quickly 
 communicated to those who can act on them; 
3.99 
In my organization systemic and recurring problems of 
 non-compliance are always reported to those with 
 sufficient authority to correct them; 
3.77 
Compliance requirements of laws, regulations, codes 
 and organizational standards are integrated into my 
 organization’s day to day operating procedures; 
3.69 
Managers in our organization know what aspects of 
 compliance they are responsible for; 
3.61 
Compliance failures are always investigated to 
 understand their cause; 
3.58 
In our organization everyone knows where the buck 
 stops for compliance (reversed); 
3.58 
My organization allocates adequate resources to  enable 
 the implementation of the compliance policy; 
3.40 
In my organization we review our compliance program 
 on a regular basis; 
3.39 
My organization is not one of those organizations that 
 try to have the best compliance of any organization in 
 the country (reversed); 
2.96 
My organization invests a lot of time and money in 
 compliance training; 
2.94 
My organization sometimes spends time and resources 
 figuring out how to get what we want without directly 
 breaching the Trade Practices Act; 
2.69 
In my organization compliance advice is often ignored 
 by line managers (reversed); 
2.14 
In my organization compliance advice is often ignored 
 by the board (If you don’t have a board, please skip  this 
 question) (reversed). 
1.79 
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5. Testing Hypothesis 2: Respondent Company’s Risk Analyses 
Risk analysis requires determining both the magnitude of the loss 
and the probability that the loss will occur.123  As there are multiple 
stakeholders who can sanction non-compliance, the salience of a 
stakeholder sanction must be determined in addition to the weight it 
is accorded.124  As the regulator is reactive,125 we add to the measure 
of legal detection of non-compliance, detection by stakeholders. 
(a) Respondents’ Weighting of Losses from Different Stakeholders 
(Table 4): We measure the way the firm weighs the magnitude of loss 
for non-compliance resulting from sanctions from different 
stakeholders by a series of questions asking about how much they 
would worry about (i) economic losses in relation to various different 
stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA; and (ii) 
losses of respect and esteem in relation to various different 
stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA.  These 
questions are all predicated on the hypothetical that the firm is 
“accused of breaches of the TPA one day in the future.”  In so doing, 
we attempt to segregate out the seriousness of the norm violation 
from the probability of it being detected. 
The businesses worry most by far about economic losses in relation 
to customers (46% worry “a lot” and 37% worry “very much”) and 
then shareholders (42% worry “a lot” and 39% worry “very 
much”).126  The next highest was only 39% worrying “a lot” or “very 
much” about economic losses from employees.127  As with worries 
about economic losses, the businesses worry most about losing the 
respect or esteem of customers (33% worry “a lot” and 58% “very 
much”) and shareholders (84% worry “a lot” or “very much”).128  But 
the vast majority (83%) would also worry “a lot” or “very much” 
about losing the respect or esteem of employees, and 73% would 
worry “a lot” or “very much” about business partners.129 
In our tests of Hypothesis 1 (see Table 4 below) we test the extent 
to which these various worries explain variation in what businesses do 
 
 123. See Parker & Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96, at 562. 
 124. See id. at 564; Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 313. 
 125. See Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?, 
supra note 114, at 445. 
 126. For further discussion of these findings, see Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, 
supra note 96, at 317. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:48 PM 
2012] FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM 333 
with regards to compliance.  It is not necessarily the case, however, 
that the more and more businesses worry about third party reactions 
to non-compliance, the more and more they will continue to try to 
improve their compliance behavior.  It seems more reasonable to 
expect there to be some “tipping point” at which a certain degree of 
worry about third parties motivates change in compliance behavior.  
Inspection of the data,130 however, could not identify any consistent 
“tipping point” at which a certain degree of worry about third parties 
was, on average, associated with a significant change in compliance 
behavior. 
Another way of modeling the relationship between worries about 
third parties and business behavior—especially in the light of the fact 
that most businesses worry quite a lot in relation to most third 
parties—is to hypothesize that it is only worries above the average 
that we can expect to have any effect on behavior.  In the regression 
analyses reported in Table 10, therefore, we measure whether or not 
worrying about specific third parties more than average has an effect 
on compliance behavior or not.131  We do this by transforming the 
measures of worries about third parties described above into dummy 
variables measuring whether or not each business rates their worries 
about third parties in the event of non-compliance as higher than the 
mean.132 
In the tests of Hypothesis 2 reported in Table 11, however, since 
we are interested in the extent to which the profession of the person 
responsible for compliance (and other variables) explains variation in 
the various worries about stakeholders, we do not use these dummy 
variables.  Instead we use as dependent variables the original ratings 
of one to five given by the firm respondents about the extent to which 
they worried about each stakeholder. 
 
  
 
 130. This inspection was carried out by running a one way ANOVA-test of each 
variable measuring worries about third parties against the dependent variables to see 
if there was any significant difference in the score on the dependent variable 
associated with one of the five levels of worry compared to the other four. 
 131. For previous uses of this technique, see, e.g., Vibeke Nielsen, Power in Public 
Implementation: A Complex, but Important Part of Power Studies, 28 
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 349, 357 (2005); Vibeke Nielsen, Differential Treatment 
and Communicative Interactions: Why the Character of Social Interaction Is 
Important, 29 LAW & POL’Y 257, 271 (2007). 
 132. Mean or less than the mean = 0; more than the mean = 1. 
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Table 4. Weighting of Losses from Different Stakeholders if Accused of Breach 
of TPA 
If your organization were accused of breaches of the 
 TPA one day in the future, how much would your 
 organization worry about . . . 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
1 to 5 (“Worry very little” to 
“Worry very much”) 
Economic 
 . . . economic losses in relation to the following groups of people: (n=924–964) 
Your customers 4.18 (0.99) 
Your shareholders 4.08 (1.06) 
Your employees 3.87 (1.04) 
The media 3.52 (1.27) 
Your business partners 3.50 (1.12) 
Consumer groups/NGOs 3.13 (1.29) 
Informal business networks 2.99 (1.17) 
Other organizations in your industry 2.90 (1.23) 
Your suppliers 2.82 (1.28) 
Your industry association 2.73 (1.31) 
Total mean (all added together) 3.37 (0.85) 
Social 
 . . . losing the respect and esteem of the following groups of people? (n=939–973) 
Your customers  4.41 (0.87) 
Your shareholders  4.22 (1.02) 
Your employees  4.13 (0.97) 
Your business partners  3.83 (1.02) 
The media  3.66 (1.22) 
Consumer groups/NGOs  3.51 (1.20) 
Other organizations in your industry  3.28 (1.24) 
Your industry association 3.27 (1.24) 
Your suppliers  3.26 (1.23) 
Informal business networks  3.21 (1.19) 
Lawyers/compliance professionals  3.14 (1.26) 
Politicians 3.13 (1.30) 
Relatives  3.03 (1.27) 
Total mean (all added together) 3.54 (0.83) 
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(b) Respondents’ Assessment of Detection Risk (Tables 5 and 6): 
We measure respondents’ assessment of the risk of detection for TPA 
violations, differentiating between informal and formal sanctioning 
processes. 
 (i) “Risk from Third Parties”: The respondents’ perception as 
to the likelihood that third parties would notice whether they 
breached the TPA: a single measure that puts together responses to 
three separate questions asking respondents to consider whether their 
trade practices are being closely observed by consumers, suppliers 
and business partners, respectively (shown in Table 5). 
 (ii) “Likelihood of ACCC Enforcement” and “Seriousness of 
Risk of ACCC Enforcement”: respondents’ perceptions of the 
likelihood and seriousness of ACCC enforcement action (shown in 
Table 6). 
 
 Table 5. Measure of Perceived Risk of Complaints from Third Parties 
Mark the number closest to the view of 
 most managers in your organization: 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
1 to 5 (‘Strongly 
disagree’ to ‘Strongly 
agree’) 
Whole Measure 
Our customers are aware of the TPA and 
 keep a close eye on our compliance. 
3.59 (1.00) 
Mean: 3.19 
Std. dev.: 0.86 
Min: 1 
Max: 5 
Cronbach’s Alpha: 
0.86 
Our suppliers are keeping a close eye on our 
 trade practices. 
3.52 (0.96) 
Our business partners focus a lot on the TPA 
 and keep an eye on our compliance. 
3.47 (0.95) 
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Table 6. Measures of Likelihood & Severity of ACCC Enforcement Action 
 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
1 to 5 (‘Strongly 
disagree’ to ‘Strongly 
agree’) 
Whole Measure 
Likelihood of ACCC Enforcement 
If we breach the TPA the chances of the ACCC 
 catching us are large.  
3.35 (1.01) 
Mean: 3.14 
Std. dev: 0.67 
Min: 1 
Max: 5 
Cronbach’s alpha: 
0.73 
 
If we were caught by the ACCC in breach of the 
 TPA the prospects of ACCC enforcement against 
 the organization are large. 
3.77 (0.91) 
It is easy for the ACCC to find out when 
 organizations breach the law. 
2.82 (1.03) 
In the light of the size and complexity of their 
 task the ACCC has appropriate resources. 
2.67 (1.01) 
A breach of the TPA does not have to be severe 
 before the ACCC bothers to do anything about  it.
3.18 (1.02) 
The investigative staff of the ACCC is very 
 competent compared to the staff and lawyers of 
 the companies they are regulating.  
2.89 (0.80) 
The ACCC is generally keeping a close eye on 
 our industry  
3.23 (1.07) 
Seriousness of Risk of ACCC Enforcement 
The level of sanctions imposed for trade practices 
 breaches is generally very high. 
3.35 (0.98) 
Mean: 3.5 
Std. dev.: 0.76 
Min: 1 
Max: 5 
Cronbach’s alpha: 
0.44 
The ACCC has a wide range of effective 
 sanctions against non-complying organizations. 
3.65 (0.90) 
 
6. Main Independent Variable 
Our survey was to be filled out on behalf of the organization by the 
most senior person in the organization with day-to-day responsibility 
for TPA compliance.  We asked this person to write down their job 
description.  These answers were then coded into business executives 
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(including CEO of the business), legal counsel (including General 
Counsel),133 finance officers (including CFOs), compliance officers, 
and Company Secretaries.  In Australia, the Company Secretary is an 
executive managerial position, fundamentally different in 
responsibilities than in the United States.134  The number and 
proportion in each category are shown in Table 1, supra.  For the 
regression analyses reported in this Article, we created five dummy 
variables to represent each of these groups of respondents.135  We 
coded as a lawyer any Australian respondent who so self-identified. 
7. Control Variables 
a. The Firm’s History 
The firm’s past compliance and non-compliance with the TPA are 
likely to influence how the firm manages compliance and how it 
assesses the costs and benefits of compliance and the risks of 
detection.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of 
the organization’s past (and present) compliance and non-
compliance.  Instead, we examine the impact of complaints about 
non-compliance.  We thus only examine the slice of the firm’s history 
in which stakeholders have been acknowledged as attempting to 
sanction the company.  The experience of these pressures may 
account for features of the formal compliance process as well as how 
compliance is managed in practice.  The experience of these pressures 
also may account for how the firm now assesses the seriousness and 
risk of non-compliance. 
(i) “Stakeholder Criticism” (Table 7): a measure of how often each 
business had been criticized by various external parties in relation to 
 
 133. In thirty-one responses to our survey, a person described himself or herself as 
both a legal counsel and also a company secretary or compliance officer.  Wherever a 
person described himself as legal counsel, they have been counted only as legal 
counsel for the purposes of the analyses reported in this Article.  This is because we 
are interested in whether identifying oneself as a lawyer makes a difference. 
 134. Compare What Does a Governance Professional Do?, CHARTERED 
SECRETARIES AUSTL., http://www.csaust.com/knowledge-resources/governance-
foundations/what-does-a-governance-professional-do.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2013), 
with Role of a Secretary, SOC’Y CORP. SECRETARIES & GOVERNANCE PROFS., 
http://main.governanceprofessionals.org/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/Abou
t/RoleofSecretary/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). See also Rosen, Diffusion, supra note 
18, at 1304–08 (discussing different understandings of the role of the corporate 
secretary). 
 135. A dummy variable is a variable that has only two possible outcomes—e.g., is the 
respondent a legal or general counsel? Yes (1) and no (0). 
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their trade practices compliance136 (divided into three groups—those 
who had experienced no criticism from any of the name groups; those 
who had experienced criticism from between one and seven of the 
various types of stakeholder; and those who had experienced criticism 
from between eight and fifteen of the various types of stakeholder).  
In an attempt to avoid self-serving denials, the question asked not 
only whether the firm but also whether comparable “others” had 
been criticized.  When such criticism is known, even if it is indirect, it 
becomes part of the firm’s history. 
 
 Table 7. Measure of Level of Criticism by Third Parties 
Below you will find a number of different 
 groups of people who may have criticized 
 your organization or others in your industry 
 for their perceived failure to comply with 
 the TPA. For each of these, please state 
 whether they have expressed such a 
 criticism within the past six years. 
% 
Respondents 
Reporting 
Criticism 
(n=999) 
Index (the number of groups 
who have criticized have been 
added together for each 
respondent. After that the 
scores have been divided into 
three categories): 
The ACCC 25% n = 999 
Mean: 1.45 
Std. dev.: 0.57 
Min.: 1 
Max.: 3 
Customers  26% 
Competitors  17% 
Media  12% 
Australian Securities and Investments 
 Commission (ASIC) 
12% 
Consumer groups/NGOs 11% 
Employees  10% 
Lawyers/compliance professionals  10% 
 
 136. The questionnaire gave respondents a list of different groups of people 
(shown in Table 7) and they were asked to indicate which, if any, had expressed 
criticism of “your organization or others in your industry for their perceived failure to 
comply with the Trade Practices Act” within the past six years.  As Table 7 shows, 
only very few businesses reported that each group had criticized them or others in 
their industry.  Most of the respondent businesses have never been criticized (53%), 
while 1% of the businesses reported they had been criticized by all the mentioned 
groups of people.  Customers, competitors, and the media were the most common 
groups from which criticism was experienced, with customers by far the most 
frequent.  This distribution of the actual experience of complaint is consistent with 
the respondents’ perception of the risk of complaints where 48% of respondents 
reported that they agreed that their customers were keeping a close eye on their 
compliance with the TPA.  The Pearson’s correlation exists between the two 
measures if 0.201 and it is statistically significant at a 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
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Politicians  9% 
Suppliers  8% 
Industry association  8% 
Business partners  6% 
Shareholders  5% 
Relatives of management  2% 
Informal business networks  2% 
 
  (ii) “ACCC Investigation”: Participants were asked whether 
the firm had been the subject of an ACCC investigation in the 
previous six years,137 because this situation represents significant 
coercive pressure from a regulatory agency.  Fourteen percent (141) 
of all respondents self-reported they had been the subject of an 
ACCC investigation of an alleged breach by their business.  The vast 
majority of ACCC investigations (over 90%) result in a settlement or 
court order in which the business suffers some adverse consequences 
(e.g., payment of compensation, financial penalties, and 
implementation of a compliance system).138 
b. Firm-Level Factors 
In previous analyses of our respondents’ compliance behavior, we 
have found the level of management oversight and planning to be 
very important, and size and resources also to be influential.139 
 (i) “Size”: We might expect that larger firms are more likely to 
have done more to implement compliance systems and manage 
compliance since the costs of doing so should be relatively lower for 
them.  Furthermore, they are likely to perceive themselves as more 
visible to a range of stakeholders because of their size and 
 
 137. The people filling out the questionnaire should generally have had enough 
knowledge to remember whether there had been an ACCC investigation in the 
previous six years as the median length of years they had spent working in the 
organization was six years (with a mean of nine years).  It was necessary to go back 
six years in order to get enough cases of companies having had ACCC investigations 
for statistical manipulation. We use a self-report measure, rather than official ACCC 
records of investigation, on the basis that it is more salient to measure those 
businesses that actually remember having been investigated by the ACCC. 
 138. See PARKER & STEPANENKO, supra note 111, at 19-–5. 
 139. See Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?, 
supra note 114, at 464–65. 
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reputation.140  It has been widely reported that larger businesses 
perceived themselves to be a greater target for ACCC enforcement 
action.141  On the other hand, larger firms may also feel less 
vulnerable to small amounts of criticism and pressure because of their 
size.  We measure size by number of employees. 
 (ii) “Organizational Resources” (Table 8): Similarly, 
companies that have greater resources to understand the TPA and 
their strategic environment might also have a higher perception of the 
risks from various external stakeholders if they breach the TPA.  
They should also be in a better position to implement compliance 
systems and other management behaviors.  The measure combines 
four questions that addressed how “well-resourced—either by 
contracting out or by using in-house expertise—do you think your 
organization is” regarding legal knowledge, economic knowledge, 
research and development, and technical knowledge relevant to 
compliance. 
 
Table 8. Questions Included in Measure of How Well-Resourced Is the 
Respondent Organization 
Question: How “well-
 resourced”—either by 
 contracting out by using in-
 house expertise—do you think 
 your organization is in the 
 following respects? 
Mean Responses for Each 
Question 
(Scale from 1–5 ‘Very badly 
resourced’ to ‘Very well 
resourced’. 3 = ‘Neither well 
nor badly resourced) 
Whole Measure 
Research and development 3.20     (n=961) Mean = 3.54 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.78 
n = 970 
Min. = 1 
Max = 5 
Std. dev. 0.75 
Legal knowledge 3.66     (n=970) 
Economic knowledge 3.69     (n=968) 
Technical knowledge relevant to 
 compliance 
3.60     (n=968) 
 
 
 140. Research on corporate social responsibility has shown that most of the companies 
that have actually changed their CSR behavior are those with highly visible brands 
who have experienced specific criticism. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 
46–74 (2006). 
 141. See Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, What Do Australian Businesses 
Think of the ACCC and Does It Matter? 22 (University of Melbourne Law School, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 377, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365513. 
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 (iii) “Level of Management Oversight and Planning” (Table 9): 
Similarly, we expect firms that are better managed to be more aware 
of external stakeholders (and the risks associated with breach in 
relation to a range of stakeholders), and also to be in a better position 
to manage compliance better. 
 
 Table 9. Questions Included in Measure of Level of Management Oversight and 
Planning 
Questions 
Mean Responses for 
Each Question 
(Scale from 1–5 
‘Strongly disagree’ to 
‘Strongly agree’.) 
Whole Measure 
Our senior managers know very well what 
 is going on in every part of our 
 organization. 
3.89    (n=969) 
Mean = 3.76 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.64 
n = 972 
Min. = 1 
Max = 5 
Std. dev. 0.72 
Our managers give a lot of priority to long 
 term strategic planning. 
3.63    (n=972) 
 
  
ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:48 PM 
342 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
IV.  RESULTS 
 Table 10. Tests of Influence of Profession of Respondent, Risk Analyses, Worries 
About Stakeholders (& Other Variables) on Compliance Management Behavior 
 
Compliance 
Mgmt. in Practice 
Complaints 
Handling 
Commc’n & 
Training 
Mgmt. Account’y 
& Whistle-
blowing 
Compl. Perf. 
Meas’t & 
Discipline 
Control Variables 
Size .08* 
(2.37) 
.07* 
(2.37) 
.09* 
(2.55) 
.08*
(2.18) 
.14*** 
(4.47) 
.10***
(3.31) 
.11*** 
(3.33) 
.10** 
(2.88) 
.08* 
(2.43) 
NS 
Resourcs. .32*** 
(10.54) 
.32*** 
(10.18) 
.16***
(4.45) 
.16***
(4.49) 
.21*** 
(6.62) 
.17***
(5.46) 
.20*** 
(5.90) 
.19*** 
(5.49) 
.16*** 
(4.68) 
.15*** 
(4.32) 
Mgmt. 
O’sight  
.15*** 
(4.97) 
.15*** 
(4.85) 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Firm History 
ACCC 
Investig. 
NS NS NS NS .21*** 
(6.89) 
.18***
(6.19) 
.18*** 
(5.36) 
.17*** 
(4.98) 
.18*** 
(5.36) 
.16*** 
(4.68) 
Stake-
holder 
Criticism 
NS NS NS NS NS NS .10** 
(2.95) 
.08* 
(2.46) 
NS NS 
Assessment of Detection Risk 
ACCC 
Likelih’d 
.18*** 
(5,21) 
.18*** 
(4.96) 
NS NS .17*** 
(4.58) 
.15***
(4.09) 
.11** 
(2.78) 
.11** 
(2.62) 
NS NS 
ACCC 
Severity 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Third 
Parties 
.16*** 
(5.32) 
.17*** 
(5.60) 
.16***
(4.57) 
.17***
(4.80) 
.14*** 
(4.64) 
.13***
(4.39) 
.09* 
(2.58) 
.09* 
(2.62) 
.16*** 
(4.73) 
.17*** 
(4.93) 
Worries About Economic Losses from: 
Cons. 
Grps./ 
NGOs 
NS NS .08* 
(2.50) 
NS -.14***
(3.83) 
-.14***
(3.96) 
NS NS NS NS 
Worries About Losing Respect and Esteem of: 
Emp’ees .10*** 
(3.50) 
.10*** 
(3.34) 
.13***
(3.74) 
15*** 
(4.38) 
.11*** 
(3.55) 
.13***
(4.44) 
NS NS NS NS 
Cons. 
Grps./ 
NGOs 
NS NS NS NS .13** 
(3.21) 
.14***
(3.62) 
NS NS NS NS 
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Other 
Org. in 
Industry 
NS NS NS NS -.12** 
(3.49) 
-.10**
(3.16) 
NS NS NS NS 
Share-
holders 
.09*** 
(3.05) 
.09*** 
(2.96) 
.09* 
(2.59) 
.09** 
(2.74) 
.08* 
(2.53) 
NS .10** 
(3.04) 
.09** 
(2.94) 
NS NS 
 Person Responsible for Compliance is: 
Fin. Off. 
(Constnt) 
# (7.18) # (-1.59) # (-9.84) # (- 6.50) # (-7.39) 
Bus. 
Exec. 
# NS # NS # NS # NS # NS 
Legal 
Counsel 
# NS # NS # .16***
(4.69) 
# NS # NS 
Compl. 
Off. 
# .07* 
(2.48) 
# .09* 
(2.60) 
# .10***
(3.28) 
# .13*** 
(3.74) 
# .14*** 
(4.05) 
Co’y Sec. # NS # NS # NS # NS # NS 
Model 
Stats: 
N = 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
of full 
model 
 
 
798 
0.40 
55.10 
*** 
 
 
785 
0.40 
37.93 
*** 
 
 
781 
0.21 
20.13 
*** 
 
 
777 
0.21 
15.36 
*** 
 
 
781 
0.38 
37.74 
*** 
 
 
781 
0.39 
33.04 
*** 
 
 
801 
0.23 
27.14 
*** 
 
 
788 
0.24 
19.57 
*** 
 
 
838 
0.17 
22.09 
*** 
 
 
826 
0.17 
15.18 
*** 
 
Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed).  Cell entries are standardized 
regression coefficients with the absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 11. Tests of Influence of Profession of Respondent (& Other Variables) on 
Weighting of Worries and Perceptions of Risk 
 
Worries 
About 
Econ. 
Losses from: 
Worries About Losses of Respect and Esteem from:
Risk from 
Third 
Parties 
Likelihood of 
ACCC 
Enforcement Consumer 
Groups/ 
NGOs 
Employees 
Consumer 
Groups/
NGOs 
Share-
holders 
Other Orgs in
Industry 
Control Variables 
Size NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS .14 
*** 
(4.54) 
.13 
*** 
(4.05) 
Resrcs  NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS .11 
** 
(3.16)
.10 
** 
(2.71) 
.16 
*** 
(4.84) 
.15 
*** 
(4.28) 
Mgmt. 
O’sight 
NS NS .11 
** 
(3.27) 
.11 
** 
(3.99)
.13 
*** 
(3.71)
.12 
** 
(3.34)
.13 
*** 
(3.77)
.13 
*** 
(3.77)
.11 
** 
(3.03)
.10 
** 
(2.78)
.13 
*** 
(3.76)
.12 
*** 
(3.59) 
NS NS 
Firm History 
Stake-
holder 
Criticsm 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS -.11
*** 
(3.20)
-.10 
* 
(2.81)
.15 
*** 
(4.52)
.14 
*** 
(4.21) 
.14 
*** 
(4.40) 
.12 
*** 
(3.64) 
ACCC 
Investig. 
NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS .09 
* 
(2.61)
NS .14 
*** 
(4.39) 
.12 
*** 
(3.82) 
Person Responsible for Compliance is: 
Fin. Off. 
(Cnstnt) 
# (8.06) # (14.44) # (9.65) # (13.4) NS NS # (3.75) # (14.11) 
Bus. 
Exec. 
# NS # NS # NS # NS NS NS # NS # NS 
Legal 
Counsel 
# NS # NS # NS # NS NS NS # .12 
** 
(3.15) 
# .11 
** 
(2.94) 
Compl. 
Off.  
# NS # NS # NS # NS NS NS # NS # NS 
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Co’y 
Sec.  
# NS # NS # NS # NS NS NS # NS # NS 
Model 
stat’s: 
N = 
Adj. R2 
F-value 
of full 
model 
 
 
920 
0.01 
3.01 
 
 
907 
0.02 
2.79 
** 
 
 
936 
0.02 
4.96 
*** 
 
 
922 
0.02 
3.40 
*** 
 
 
933 
0.02
3.82
*** 
 
 
919 
0.02
3.07
** 
 
 
907 
0.03
6.82
*** 
 
 
893 
0.03
3.96
*** 
 
 
935 
0.02
5.42
*** 
 
 
921 
0.03 
3.59 
*** 
 
 
891 
0.08
16.75
*** 
 
 
878 
0.09 
10.55 
*** 
 
 
945 
0.13 
29.13 
*** 
 
 
932 
0.13 
16.85 
*** 
 
Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed).  Cell entries are standardized 
regression coefficients with the absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
The regressions shown in Tables 10 and 11 test whether the 
profession of the respondent—the person responsible for compliance 
within the firm—has an effect on compliance management behavior 
directly (Hypothesis 1) or indirectly (Hypothesis 2).  Each Table 
shows a number of regressions because we use a number of 
dependent variables to measure compliance management behavior 
(Table 10) and analyses of risk of non-compliance (Table 11).  In each 
case, as mentioned above, two models are tested with and without the 
profession of the respondent in order to test whether inclusion of the 
profession adds anything to the explanation or not.  The test of the 
model that includes the profession of the person responsible for 
compliance is on the right and in bold for each pair of regressions for 
each dependent variable. 
A. Hypothesis 1: Direct Effects of Professional Orientation on 
Compliance Management Behaviors 
We hypothesized first that compliance management behaviors will 
differ between firms that have individuals from different professions 
in charge of compliance.  Table 10 shows there is in fact little 
evidence of any direct effect of profession on any of our dependent 
variables measuring formal compliance system implementation and 
substantive compliance management.  The R-squares for each pair of 
regressions for each of the five dependent variables remains the same, 
or improves only very slightly, when we include the profession of the 
person responsible for compliance into the model.  This suggests that 
profession does not add much, if anything, to the explanation.  
Moreover, when profession is included in the regressions, except for 
compliance officers, it is rarely significant. 
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Hypothesis 1A: The profession of the “individual in charge of 
compliance” will make for differences between firms in the formal 
compliance system elements that they are reported to have 
implemented. 
Table 10 shows that if the profession of the respondent was finance 
officer, business executive, or company secretary, such profession had 
no significant effect on the formal compliance system elements 
reported as being implemented.  For firms with legal counsel or, 
particularly, compliance officer respondents, the implementation of 
more formal compliance system elements was reported.  If the person 
responsible for compliance is a legal counsel, this is only true for 
“communication and training” elements of compliance systems.  But 
where it is a compliance officer, the organization is significantly more 
likely to have put in place each of the elements of formal compliance 
systems.  “Communication and training” elements include the 
presence of manuals and training programs about the Act. 
In the set of equations reported in Table 10, including the 
profession of the person responsible for compliance in the model 
makes no dramatic changes in the regression equation factors except 
in relation to two variables: (1) when profession is included the 
implementation of “communication and training” elements of 
compliance systems is not significantly related to worries about losing 
the respect and esteem of shareholders; (2) similarly, worries about 
economic losses from consumer groups/NGOs drops out of the 
explanation for implementation of “complaints handling” elements of 
compliance systems when profession is included in the model.  In 
both cases, however, having a compliance officer responsible for 
compliance is significantly associated with implementation of the 
relevant compliance system element.  In the case of worries about 
shareholders and implementation of the communication and training 
elements of compliance systems, having a legal counsel responsible 
for compliance is also significant.  These findings suggest that the 
professional orientation of the person responsible for compliance is 
responsible for the reported worries about economic losses from 
consumer groups or NGOs and losses of esteem of shareholders. 
Hypothesis 1B: The occupational/professional background of the 
“individual in charge of compliance” will make for differences 
between firms in their substantive compliance management 
behaviors. 
Table 10 shows that having a compliance officer responsible for 
compliance is the only professional orientation that is significantly 
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associated with compliance management in practice, but that 
association is fairly weak. 
In Table 10, we also test for the influence of firms’ risk analyses on 
compliance management behaviors.142  Worries about the reactions of 
employees and shareholders to non-compliance most consistently 
factor into implementation of both formal and more substantive 
compliance management behaviors.  In both cases it is losses of 
respect and esteem, not economic losses, that have an effect.   
We also find that worries about both economic losses and social 
losses from consumer groups or NGOs relate to implementation of 
communication and training elements of formal compliance systems.  
Worries about economic losses from consumer groups or NGOs are 
also weakly significant for implementation of complaints handling 
systems.  Finally, worries about losses of respect and esteem from 
“other organizations in your industry” are significantly associated 
with lower implementation of communication and training elements 
of formal compliance systems.143 
It is these worries that actually impact on compliance management 
behavior.  Thus we hypothesize (Hypothesis 2) that it is by 
influencing the perceptions of these risks that the profession of the 
person in charge of compliance has an indirect effect on the firm’s 
compliance behaviors.  We test this hypothesis in Table 11 (discussed 
below). 
Compliance management behavior is also significantly influenced 
by the likelihood of ACCC enforcement and likelihood of complaint 
from third parties.  Consequently, to test Hypothesis 2, we also need 
to know to what extent these assessments of risk are influenced by the 
profession of the respondent. 
 
 142. Because of the significance of perception of risk of complaint by third parties in the 
results of these analyses (and the lack of significance of worries about economic and social 
losses in relation to the various third parties), we also made the same analyses again 
excluding the perception of risk of complaints from third parties to check whether this had 
been masking the significance of worries about third parties.  This made no difference to the 
significance of worries about third parties.  Similarly, we also made the regression step-
wise with ACCC investigation added as an independent variable last in case it was 
masking the influence of third parties.  This also made no difference to the results. 
 143. These findings have been discussed at greater length in separate papers on 
data from the same survey published previously by two of the co-authors of the 
current Article. See generally Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96; Parker 
& Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96. 
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B. Hypothesis 2: Indirect Effect of Profession on Risk Analyses 
We have seen in the discussion of the results in Table 10 above that 
professional orientation has little direct effect on compliance 
management behaviors.  We also have seen that firms’ risk analyses 
have some influence on compliance management behavior.  Table 11 
shows the results of tests to determine whether the profession of the 
person responsible for compliance has an indirect effect on 
compliance management behavior by influencing the way in which 
the firm is reported to analyze the risks of non-compliance and to be 
worried about different stakeholders.  To do this we used a series of 
regressions (shown in Table 11) to test the influence of the profession 
of the person responsible for compliance on each of the worries and 
risk analysis variables that turned out to have a significant influence 
on compliance management behavior (as shown in Table 10).  We 
also include the same control variables as for the regressions in Table 
10. 
Again we conducted two regressions for each dependent variable 
comparing the power of the explanation with and without including 
the profession of the respondent in the analysis.  Once again, as Table 
11 shows, adding the professional or occupational background of the 
person responsible for compliance to the explanatory model does not 
improve the R-squares for each of the regressions, or makes them 
only very slightly higher.  This means that including the profession of 
the person responsible for compliance to the model does not add 
much to the explanation. 
Hypothesis 2A: The professional background of the “individual in 
charge of compliance” will make for differences between firms in 
their reported concern about the loss of esteem by and economic 
sanctions from various stakeholders. 
We find no evidence that the profession of the person responsible 
for compliance makes any significant difference at all to the weighting 
(or valuation) of worries about economic and social losses in relation 
to different stakeholders if the organization were to breach the TPA 
at some point in the future.  We only examine the worries that we 
found to make a difference to compliance management behavior in 
Table 10.  The R-squares for the regressions seeking to explain 
variation in worries about the various stakeholders are very poor 
(0.01–0.03)—suggesting that there are other things explaining this 
variation that we have not captured in our model.  We do, however, 
find that one of our control variables, management oversight and 
planning, makes a significant difference to most of these worries.  
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This suggests that there may be something about the management 
style of a firm that leads to it worrying more about stakeholder 
reactions to non-compliance, but our model is not powerful enough to 
draw further conclusions about this.144 
Hypothesis 2B: The professional background of the “individual in 
charge of compliance” will make for differences between firms in 
their assessments of the risks of (i) stakeholders and (ii) regulators 
detecting non-compliance. 
Where the person responsible for compliance in the firm is a 
lawyer, the firm is significantly more likely to perceive both a higher 
risk of complaint from third parties about TPA compliance issues and 
a higher likelihood and severity of ACCC enforcement action.  Apart 
from this finding, the profession of the person responsible for 
compliance does not make any significant difference to the way firms 
assess the more immediate risk from stakeholders and the regulator 
in relation to TPA compliance. 
As we would expect, those organizations that had experienced 
actual criticism from stakeholders in relation to TPA compliance in 
the past also see the likelihood of further pressure from both third 
parties and the regulator as higher.  This was true regardless of 
whether the person responsible for compliance was included in the 
model or not.  This fits well with general observations that people 
estimate the risk of something they know and see as immediate as 
higher than something they do not know or have not experienced 
before, regardless of true probabilities.145 
Those organizations that have experienced an ACCC investigation 
in the past also see the likelihood of further regulatory enforcement 
action as well as complaints from third parties as higher (and we saw 
above that these worries do influence implementation of compliance 
management behaviors).  But, this changes when we include the 
person responsible for compliance in the explanatory model: the fact 
 
 144. For further discussion of the importance of management oversight and 
planning (or long term management approach, as we sometimes label this variable) 
throughout our analyses of these survey data, see generally Parker & Nielsen, supra 
note 95; Parker & Nielsen, How Much Does it Hurt?, supra note 96. 
 145. See generally MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, 
INTENTION, AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975); 
JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN (1994); 
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004). 
ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:48 PM 
350 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
that a lawyer is responsible for the firm’s compliance is significantly 
related to perceptions of the risk of third party and regulator action 
on non-compliance, and the significance of the ACCC having 
investigated the firm in the past drops out of the equation. 
This probably reflects the fact that lawyers are likely to be made 
the person responsible for TPA compliance after a firm has 
experienced an ACCC investigation.  In this Article, we do not seek 
to explain why firms select persons of particular professional 
backgrounds to be the person responsible for compliance.146  But we 
do know from analysis of our data that the size of the firm and 
whether it has had contact with or has been investigated by the 
ACCC in the past, is significant in explaining whether a lawyer is the 
person responsible for compliance.147  An organization that has had an 
ACCC investigation is more likely to have put a lawyer in charge of 
TPA compliance (at some stage—we do not know when—but it may 
well have been in response to the investigation), and that lawyer will 
assess the risk of future ACCC enforcement actions and third party 
complaints as significantly higher than people with other professional 
orientations in other organizations. 
 
  
 
 146. For a discussion of this topic, see Deepak K. Datta & James P. Guthrie, 
Executive Succession:  Organizational Antecedents of CEO Characteristics, 15 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 569 (1994). 
 147. See infra Table 12. 
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Table 12. Lawyers More Likely to be Responsible for Compliance Where Firm 
Has Had ACCC Investigation 
Independent Variables 
Respondent Is a Law 
Professional 
Size .58*** 
Industry 
1. Primary Industries 
2. Manufacturing & Construction 
3. Wholesale Trade 
4. Retail & Hospitality 
5. Fin. & Ins., Property & Bus. Servs., Transport & Storage 
6. Government & Essential Services 
7. Education & Other Services 
 
.34 
.29 
.01 
-.22 
.29 
-.01 
.01 
Admit breach (No = 0, Yes = 1)  .09 
Investigated by the ACCC (No = 0, Yes = 1) .82* 
Interaction with the ACCC (No = 0, Yes = 1) .97*** 
Level of experienced criticism .31 
Model statistics:  
N = Naglekerke’s R2 
F-value of full model 
 
919 
.23*** 
 
Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed). Cell entries are B-coefficients 
 
Control Variables: We also find that larger and better-resourced 
firms are significantly more likely to perceive the risk of ACCC 
enforcement and third party complaints as higher.  As mentioned in 
our discussion of our hypotheses, this is probably because larger firms 
see themselves as a larger target.  It may also be because they have 
more resources to be aware of the risk.148 
 
 148. See Parker & Nielson, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96, at 597. 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
A. Summary of Results 
We hypothesized that firm compliance behavior was responsive to 
the professional background of the person responsible for compliance 
in two interrelated ways—directly and indirectly.   
Directly, we expected that the profession of the respondent would 
lead to reporting different levels of implementation of formal 
compliance systems and different substantive compliance 
management practices.  We thought we would find this result for 
three different reasons. 
First, we had several accounts of professional framing.  Because 
different professions have different norms and heuristics, we 
hypothesized that compliance departments led by members of 
different professions would operate differently.  Or, because different 
professions have different cognitive structures, for respondents from 
different professions, different factors would be salient and more 
likely to be reported. 
Second, we expected that the selection of a particular profession to 
lead compliance might reflect something about the firm.  These 
differences would be reported back to us by the different 
professionals.   
Third, to the extent that there is subjectivity in the responses to our 
survey, the subjectivity would lead to the display of that which is 
normatively desirable in the respondent’s profession.  Or, the 
subjectivity might lead to more instrumental responses, justifying 
their profession’s cast of mind as appropriate for management of the 
compliance function. 
We also expected an indirect influence of the respondent’s 
profession by influencing the firm’s identity and values in relation to 
its environment and therefore its compliance management behavior.  
We hypothesized that the professional background of the individual 
inside the firm who was in charge of compliance would influence the 
firm to weigh the risk of stakeholder reactions to non-compliance 
differently, and that this in turn would lead them to put in place 
different compliance management behaviors. 
Overall, we found little evidence of either direct or indirect 
influence.  The main effects of professional orientation we found 
were that having a compliance officer in charge of compliance leads 
to a direct effect on both implementation of formal compliance 
systems and also more substantive compliance management 
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behaviors.  Having a lawyer in charge of compliance leads to a direct 
effect on only one aspect of formal compliance system 
implementation: communication and training elements.  Having a 
lawyer in charge also has an effect on implementation of both formal 
compliance system elements and substantive compliance management 
through the lawyer’s influence on the firm’s increased perception of 
risk from third parties and the regulator. 
Those who are in charge of compliance who identify as compliance 
specialists are more likely to make sure that the organization 
implements more fulsome compliance systems.  This is hardly 
surprising given the compliance profession specializes in putting 
compliance structures in place in an organization.  We might have 
thought, given the professional rhetoric of compliance officers, that 
the structures they have in place would also be more likely to 
translate to substantively better compliance management in practice.  
Although our evidence is consistent with this expectation, it is not as 
dramatic as we, and compliance specialists, might have wished. 
We find no direct relation between having a lawyer in charge of 
compliance and there being complaint handling mechanisms within 
the firm.  Neither do we find any relation between putting a lawyer in 
charge of compliance and increased management accountability and 
whistle-blowing mechanisms.  Further, we do not find any relation 
between having a lawyer in charge of compliance and the firm 
measuring compliance and disciplining non-compliance.  By contrast, 
having a designated compliance manager in charge of compliance 
leads to all of these structures promoting compliance and punishing 
non-compliance. 
We do not find that having a lawyer in charge of compliance has 
any effect on compliance management in practice.  Items such as 
“Compliance failures are always investigated” or “Managers in our 
organization know what aspects of compliance they are responsible 
for” are not reported more (or less) often by lawyer respondents than 
non-lawyer respondents.  Table 10 shows that having a compliance 
officer responsible for compliance is the only professional orientation 
that is significantly associated with compliance management in 
practice, but that association is fairly weak.149  This suggests that the 
compliance system elements introduced by legal counsel and 
compliance officers may be purely formal, even symbolic.  Lawyers 
and compliance officers might find it important to make the symbolic 
 
 149. See supra Table 10. 
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and formal efforts of making a compliance system, but this does not 
necessarily mean it makes any difference in compliance practice. 
We do find that lawyers are more likely to report that their firm 
has a greater likelihood of regulatory enforcement and a greater 
likelihood of complaints (suits) by third parties about regulatory 
breaches.  That is, lawyers see the firm as more legally exposed.  
These measurements of risk do have an impact on firm structure and 
behavior.  We therefore find an indication of some sort of cycle of 
legal risk or legalization in which the experience of a close shave with 
the ACCC might mean an organization puts a lawyer in charge of 
TPA compliance and the lawyer maintains a constant perception of a 
high risk from the ACCC and other third parties in relation to TPA 
non-compliance. 
This does not, however, seem to play out into any sort of different 
thinking by the lawyer regarding the economic and social value of 
different stakeholders for the organization, and how that might affect 
the organization’s compliance activities.  Nor does it play out in 
changing commitments to compliance.  Its result appears only to 
increase the likelihood that the firm will have written policies, 
manuals, and training programs. 
Overall it is the perception of risk of discovery of non-compliance 
by third parties and the government, rather than the profession (and 
presumably the values or ideology) of the person responsible for 
compliance that makes a difference in what the businesses do about 
compliance according to our data.150  Experience of actual coercive 
pressure from stakeholders (i.e., ACCC investigation and, to a lesser 
extent, experienced criticism by third parties and the perception of 
risk of loss from stakeholders) are very important for compliance 
behavior both directly (Table 10) and also indirectly through 
influence on the way risks are perceived (Table 11).151  Including the 
profession of the person responsible for compliance in our models 
makes little difference.  This suggests that a history of non-
compliance detection—through third party criticism and ACCC 
investigation—and associated heightened perceptions of risk for the 
future, have a direct impact on firm thinking about risks of non-
compliance and that is not necessarily mediated through the 
professional orientation of the person responsible for compliance. 
 
 150. Note that it is risk of discovery that is explanatory rather than reported 
worries about loss of respect or esteem or economic losses from stakeholders. 
 151. We have discussed this finding in greater depth in another paper based on the 
same data. See Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 329–38. 
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B. Limitations of Study 
There are some potential limitations on the general application of 
our data, which suggest further research in this area should be 
undertaken.  We found a lack of permeation of norms/stakeholder 
concerns into the firm via the profession of the person responsible for 
compliance.  This may be because the area of compliance we are 
looking at (competition and consumer protection law) is simply not 
an area where there are clear social norms with which any particular 
professional group clearly identifies.152  It might have been different if 
we had looked at firms’ occupational health and safety compliance 
and compared firms with safety engineers, lawyers, and business 
executives in charge of compliance. 
It may simply be that the knowledge of how to stimulate and 
monitor compliance may not be part of the lawyerly cast of mind.  
Compliance may require organizational skills, which may not be part 
of what a lawyer’s practice or socialization develops.  It may simply 
be that the legal profession has no interest in claiming jurisdiction 
over compliance jobs, despite the fact that we are speaking of 
compliance with the law. 
Moreover, our model of how legal norms become embedded within 
firms makes a number of assumptions.  First, it assumes that the 
interests of the “individual in charge of compliance” derive from their 
occupational/professional background.  Second, it assumes that “the 
individual in charge of compliance” has the capacity to direct 
corporate behaviors. 
Our model, however, is not dependent on a restricted view of 
power or agency.  We are taking the selection of a compliance leader 
as a proxy for understanding cognitive and social processes within the 
organization.153  For example, we recognize that in examining only the 
professional role of the person in charge of compliance, we are eliding 
that decision-making often is the product of a team154 and occurs 
 
 152. The competition policy side of the Australian TPA may be particularly 
ambiguous in its level of professional and political support. See generally Fiona 
Haines & Caron Beaton-Wells, Ambiguities in Criminalizing Cartels: A Political 
Economy, 52 BRIT. J. CRIM. 953 (2012); Christine Parker, Economic Rationalities of 
Governance and Ambiguity in the Criminalization of Cartels, 52 BRIT. J. CRIM. 974, 
974 (2012). 
 153. See generally Mason A. Carpenter et al., Upper Echelons Research Revisited: 
Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition, 
30 J. MGMT. 749 (2004). 
 154. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63, at 202. 
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within a political structure.155  Although we often speak about the 
consequences of having a certain type of leader, we are not wedded to 
an anthropocentric model of a leader deciding.  Instead, we are 
adopting a shorthand to describe corporate processes.  Behind our 
model is the more general claim that differences between firms are 
revealed by or result from the occupational/professional identity of 
the person in charge of compliance.   
We also have assumed that our categorization of the respondents 
into different professions and functional backgrounds is accurate.  We 
do not know the educational training of our respondents.  We do not 
know how long they practiced law or whether they are the CFO now, 
but were the CLO last year.  We did not ask these questions in our 
survey because its focus was on compliance, not professionalism.  
Nonetheless, we are rather confident that all those we coded as 
lawyers are legally trained and have practice experience.  That army 
of 181, all of whom claim a lawyer identity, does not appear to be 
standing on the machinery of justice or at the outposts of the legal 
profession.156   
With the exception of CEOs who may have emerged from sales or 
product development, all of our respondents have what has been 
termed “throughput experiences.”157  Administration, law, and 
accounting are classified as “throughput functions” and hence, our 
data may confirm those who claim that it is “output” versus 
“throughput” experience that divides managers.  The lack of 
environmental scanning responsibilities, however, is what 
distinguishes throughput experiences.158  Our respondents did scan the 
environment since external risks are central to the compliance 
function, and they perceived the environment differently.  There is 
sizable variation in their responses, but we have not by our analyses 
in this Article explained the variation.  Except as we have explained, 
their professional background and their company’s compliance 
behaviors were not linked to their scanning.  
Finally, these findings may suffer from the problem of reverse 
causality159: because the firm wanted manuals and internal training 
 
 155. See generally James G. March, The Business Firm as a Political Coalition, 24 
J. POL. 662 (1962). 
 156. See supra note 1. 
 157. See supra note 63. 
 158. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Barker & Mueller, supra note 16, at 795 (“What is the causal nature of the 
relationships we have found between CEO characteristics and R&D spending?  
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programs, it hired lawyers.  Because the firm desired robust formal 
compliance systems, they hired compliance experts.  Given the 
limitations of our data, we have no way to determine causality. 
C. Firm Identity and the Profession of the Person in Charge of 
Compliance 
In determining the salience of different stakeholders, and the 
pressures they can bring to bear, a firm makes choices about its 
identity.  We hypothesized that compliance departments headed by 
members of different professions would worry about economic and 
esteem losses from different stakeholders.  By influencing the 
company’s perceptions of the risks of non-compliance, the 
professional would indirectly influence compliance behavior. 
Our respondents were surveyed about ten stakeholders who could 
impose economic losses on the firm and thirteen stakeholders whose 
esteem for the firm might be damaged should the firm be accused of 
TPA breaches.  There is a fair amount of variation in the 
respondents’ ratings of their worries about different stakeholders and 
from stakeholder to stakeholder.160 
Yet, contrary to our hypotheses, we find no evidence that the 
profession of the person responsible for compliance makes a 
difference to the firm’s perception of the risks of non-compliance in 
relation to these different stakeholders.  To the extent that people 
responsible for compliance have different values and norms in 
relation to how the firm should value different stakeholders, this does 
not appear to track professional identity.  The cognitive 
distinctiveness of the different professions is blanched out in intra-
firm processes.  Although the professionals inside the corporation are 
known as “boundary-spanning” personnel, we find no evidence that 
the professionals responsible for compliance cause the firm to focus 
on either the economic or social good will of particular external 
stakeholders.  It is not the person in charge of compliance who 
coordinates or controls the firm’s perception of its stakeholders. 
 
Because we lack longitudinal data, we cannot tell how stable the relationships are 
across time.  This limitation also means that . . . there is the possibility of reverse 
causality.  For example, it could be that firms spending large amounts on R&D look 
for CEO candidates with R&D or marketing career experience.”); Chaganti & 
Sambharya, supra note 68, at 396; Datta & Guthrie, supra note 146, at 574; Smith & 
White, supra note 68, at 271 (finding relationship between firm’s previous strategy 
and successor’s functional background); Thomas et al., supra note 68, at 514–20. 
 160. See supra Table 4. 
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We often think of implementation of compliance systems, including 
complaint handling systems, as directed at convincing external 
stakeholders, like customers, that an organization is doing the right 
thing.  But our results suggest that internal stakeholders (employees) 
are in some ways a more important “audience” for compliance 
management activities than many external stakeholders.  In Table 10, 
worries about losing the respect and esteem of employees was 
significantly associated with increased implementation of the basic 
aspects of formal compliance structures and also compliance 
management in practice.  This may be because senior managers 
understand that by definition, employees are keeping a “close eye” 
on compliance from the inside, and risk of detection is what motivates 
compliance practices.161 
The second part of risk analysis is the measurement of the risk of 
loss, in this case from the detection of noncompliance.  We also find, 
with one exception, no evidence of professional orientation making a 
difference to this component of risk analysis.  Our data suggests that 
risk analysis within the firm must be controlled by other norms 
regarding both the legal and non-legal enforceability of compliance. 
The sole exception concerns lawyers.  Although lawyers do not 
differently weigh the types and magnitudes of losses from non-
compliance, they are more likely to perceive that both the regulator 
and third parties would detect noncompliance.  This finding may 
support the position of those who argue that lawyers tend to overstate 
legal risks.162  The lawyer cast of mind may induce lawyers to be 
lightning-rod salesmen of charged conflict. 
Unfortunately, the causal direction is not clear.  It might equally be 
the other way around—that those firms that do in fact have a higher 
risk of detection and enforcement of this area of law by the regulator 
or third parties are more likely to have a lawyer in charge of 
compliance.  Researchers of compliance in other areas of law have 
found that compliance managers are more likely than lawyers to 
overstate legal risks.163  Others have shown that compliance 
structures, especially those adopted in response to overstated risks, 
 
 161. We have discussed this in more detail in another paper focusing on other 
aspects of our data. See Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 337. 
 162. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the 
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
375, 379–80 (1997). 
 163. See, e.g., Edelman et al., Professional Construction, supra note 65, at 80.  This 
finding is discussed further below at text accompanying note 181. 
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divert the firm from concern with noncompliance, offering formal 
compliance instead of a changed workplace.164 
Our findings would support these conclusions.  What our findings 
add is the independence of perceptions of risk of loss from the 
perceptions of the magnitude of loss.  Although lawyers may 
overstate risk, the definition of the situation—how and why non-
compliance is worrisome—does not change.  Our data would predict 
that when lawyers lead compliance programs, firms will introduce 
measures that reduce the risk of loss but that the firm will not 
experience change in its understandings of the significance of 
noncompliance or the value of compliance. 
We see more evidence here of businesses pragmatically responding 
to focused application of stakeholder pressure than of businesses 
responding in a principled way to their assessment of stakeholder 
values and concerns.  This is reflected in the fact that greater 
normative commitment to compliance is correlated to the perception 
of being watched, rather than worries about economic losses or losses 
of respect and esteem. 
Obedience to the law when one is not being monitored 
distinguishes mere compliance with the law from “willing acceptance 
of the law.”165  In these terms, we find that the person in charge of 
compliance reports that the firm has not accepted the law.  We do not 
find a “compliance norm,” or “norm of law abidingness” that “should 
elicit compliance even where the firm’s activity is shielded from the 
regulator’s gaze.”166 
D. Firm Norms and Professional Behavior 
We have found that neither direct nor indirect influences of 
professional orientation are very good at explaining compliance 
 
 164. See generally Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin Talesh, To Comply or Not to 
Comply—That Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of 
Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103 
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011); Lauren B. Edelman et al., 
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 
27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 499–500 (1993); Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity, supra 
note 100, at 75; Gilad, supra note 120, at 326–27; Carol A. Heimer, Competing 
Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in Neonatal Intensive Care, 33 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 17 (1999). 
 165. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in 
Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 
1292 (2005). 
 166. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 
451, 455 (2003) (citations omitted). 
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behavior and that there is no evidence that the person in charge of 
compliance mediates the influence of stakeholders.  Instead, we are 
led to infer that there are firm-level (non-legally enforceable) norms 
that determine compliance behavior.  Firms have compliance 
cultures167 and their norms restrain the exercise of professional 
judgment.  The person in charge of compliance abides by these 
norms. 
This contradicts our model, which had depicted professional norms 
as shaping firm behavior.  Our model suggested that the person in 
charge of compliance might defect from other firm norms.  Judged 
from the perspective of the firm, such defections are costly, both in 
terms of morale and future cooperation.168  Thus, it is not surprising 
that we find evidence that firms must have informal governance 
mechanisms that inhibit such defections.  Finding that the persons in 
charge of compliance are guided by firm—not professional—norms, is 
consistent with recognizing that they have been “promoted” to this 
position and have been rewarded for subscribing to firm norms.169 
On the other hand, in choosing professionals, whether they are 
financial, legal, compliance, or the company secretary, to lead 
compliance, the firm signals that it has incorporated external norms 
into its decision-making.  It signals that compliance with law extends 
beyond ordinary managerial decision-making.  Despite these signals, 
however, we find that the firm integrates professional norms in a 
manner that is least disruptive to the internal workings of the 
organization.170   
The governance structure that our results reveal makes action in 
the firm relatively impermeable to social pressures.  It does not 
include professional norms in its definition of the situation.  It also 
does not especially include the environment to which the professional 
is responsive.  Even though firm interests sometimes will support 
professional ones, such as when internal whistle-blowing deters 
 
 167. Rosen, Diffusion, supra note 18, at 1289. 
 168. See Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging 
Perspectives, Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 569, 592 (1999); see also 
Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames and 
Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 687 (1999). 
 169. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from 
the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the 
Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 302-03 (2004) (noting as well that the 
promoted actor may conceal “the inclination to defect when necessary”). 
 170. See Bamberger, supra note 24, at 428. 
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potentially expensive misconduct,171 the relative impermeability of the 
firm to professional and social norms supports unlawful behavior, as 
decision-making is unmoored from social interests.172  The insularity 
of the firm is attested to by our findings that concerns about reactions 
from employees, not external others, best predicts compliance 
behavior. 
We find that firms do not allocate formal compliance resources in a 
manner consistent with their risk analyses.  Given this result, we 
suspect that the additional formal compliance elements that are 
implemented when lawyers and compliance officers are in charge of 
compliance are side-payments to them.  Consequently, the firm’s 
implementation of formal compliance elements may be the result of 
rent-seeking behavior by those in charge of compliance. 
On the other hand, a company that hires a compliance manager to 
run a compliance system may know that they are buying a compliance 
system with more elements.  If they hire a lawyer, they may know that 
they are buying manuals and training programs.  These come along 
with lawyers as standard equipment that cannot be refused.173  Firms 
may choose to contract with these agents, incurring these costs in 
exchange for more valuable benefits. 
Firms may hire compliance experts or lawyers (or other 
professionals) to reduce the costs of monitoring these managers.  But, 
they find that this will result in increased expenses for formal 
compliance elements.  These expenses may serve as signals to 
outsiders of compliance, even if they are mere window dressing.  
These expenses also serve as signals to the person in charge of 
 
 171. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of 
Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1212 (2003). 
 172. See Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational 
Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (1982). 
 173. “[L]egal compliance professionals have an incentive to recommend means of 
containing legal risk or legal ambiguity that require substantial involvement by legal 
compliance professions and fall squarely within their area of expertise such as . . . 
employee manuals, or . . . requiring certain types of employee training.” Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 487, 529–30 (2003). 
Producing manuals and conducting training programs at the organizational 
level enables corporations to assign blame to employees who failed to 
follow the lessons . . . [and] shift liability away form the corporation or 
board. . . .  This can occur even if the manuals and programs are weakly 
calibrated to promote actual substantive performance. 
Cunningham, supra note 22, at 314. 
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compliance of the firm’s commitment to her.  Our data suggest that 
they substitute for firm commitments to legal values. 
This explanation is consistent with our very strong findings that 
compliance behavior is responsive to organizational size and 
resources.  This suggests that to understand compliance behavior, one 
must examine not only the risks to which the organization is subject, 
but also “organizational slack,” how uncommitted managerial 
resources are accumulated and distributed in the firm.174  Formal 
compliance systems may be investments in binding the person in 
charge of compliance to the firm, paid for by using organizational 
slack. 
E. The Two Faces of Lawyers 
In a prior analysis of data from the same survey,175 we sought to 
determine what effect lawyers had on clients.  We found that lawyers 
often reinforced client commitments to legal compliance.  Clients, 
however, differed in their attitudes to compliance and their lawyers 
followed their clients’ lead.  We found that there was “evidence that 
lawyers (and compliance officers) do more to implement compliance 
systems, improve knowledge and understanding of compliance and 
monitoring of compliance within the organization than where others 
are in charge of compliance.”176  Yet, lawyers draw back from 
changing client normative commitments to compliance.  They 
contribute technical information and means. 
We also found that when “[l]awyers are charged with being overly 
adversarial, putting stumbling blocks in the path of regulation, 
instigating clients not to comply with regulators, and souring relations 
between their clients and regulators,” they often do so in response to 
client demands, not as part of their professional cast of mind.177 
 
 174. See generally L.J. Bourgeois, III, On the Measurement of Organizational 
Slack, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 29, 31 (1981).  Organizational slack, when it is not 
described as inefficient, has been said to serve four different functions: (1) it can be 
used to bind members to the firm; (2) it can be used for conflict resolution; (3) it can 
be used to manage workflow, and (4) it can be deployed for expanding the adaptive 
capacities of the firm. See generally Mark P. Sharfman et al., Antecedents of 
Organizational Slack, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601 (1988). 
 175. See generally Christine Parker, Richard Eli Rosen & Vibeke L. Nielsen, The 
Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with 
Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2009). 
 176. See id. at 238. 
 177. See id. at 239. 
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On the other hand, we did find that lawyers lead clients to “game-
playing.”  We asked the respondents to scale whether a “wise 
organization uses the loopholes in the law” and whether “my 
organization spends time and resources figuring out how to get what 
we want without directly breaching” the regulations.  Even in firms 
committed to compliance, some lawyers adopted this game-playing 
attitude, leading clients to non-compliance.178 
We concluded that the dichotomy of professional versus non-
professional failed to take into account both the determining effects 
of clients who are committed to compliance and that lawyers 
“negotiate with themselves and the profession over the character of 
professionalism in the law.”179  When clients are committed to 
compliance, lawyers can create a virtuous cycle, unless the lawyer 
understands game-playing to be part of the professional cast of mind. 
In this Article, we find only two possible components of a lawyer 
cast of mind.  First, lawyers may put in place paper compliance 
systems, like manuals, and training programs: these do not change the 
normative orientation of the client toward compliance.  Paper 
compliance systems are consistent with our earlier finding of lawyers 
as engaged in game-playing.180  Lawyers may assume an identity as 
window-dressers prettifying the firm for the regulator without 
improving compliance. 
Second, we find that lawyers stress the likelihood of litigation, 
either private or public.  This finding depicts lawyers as lightning-rod 
salesmen, stressing that precautions should be taken because “you 
should be frightened.”  The problem is that we do not find that the 
firms take substantive precautions in response to this fear mongering. 
In our findings, lawyers more than compliance officers stressed the 
risk of litigation.  In Edelman’s research on affirmative action, she 
found that human resource officers were more likely than lawyers to 
stress the risk of litigation, even distorting cases to increase the 
perceived risk.181  She explained that these human resource officers 
were in competition with lawyers and depicted the legal environment 
as a risky one in order to support their claims to corporate power.182  
As in Edelman’s work, in our research, compliance managers and 
lawyers may be in conflict over who should be in charge of TPA 
 
 178. See id. at 240. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 241. 
 181. See Edelman et al., supra note 65, at 72–73. 
 182. See id. at 76. 
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compliance.  This work suggests that stressing the risk of litigation is 
instrumental.183  By stressing the risk of litigation, our lawyers are 
competing for power within the firm.  Rather than the lightning-rod 
salesperson being part of the lawyer cast of mind, it may be a persona 
that lawyers, like Edelman’s human resources personnel, adopt when 
it suits their instrumental needs.  But, as our data shows, when 
lawyers gain power they use it only to window-dress the firm. 
Donald Langevoort has suggested that the “emerging ethics and 
compliance industry . . . promot[e] their own professional autonomy” 
by claiming that “there is something in the language, training, 
socialization, personality and/or professional identity of lawyers that 
has this effect, . . . that lawyers predictably frustrate focus on ethics 
beyond minimal legal compliance.”184  In particular, he wonders 
whether the lawyer cast of mind obscures differences between “a 
‘paper program’ . . . and one that actually drives desired behavior in a 
meaningful way.”185  Our data defends lawyers because they are 
lightning-rod salespeople, stressing the risk of detection.  More 
important, our good news is that the emerging ethics and compliance 
profession is similarly afflicted by the charges they cast against 
lawyers.  
CONCLUSION: BACK TO JULIUS HENRY COHEN 
Cohen knew the lawyer cast of mind as an acquired virtue, 
particularly frail and subject to counter-socialization.186  He 
campaigned against business entering the profession.187  Here, we 
have the profession entering business, and our results suggest that the 
lawyer cast of mind is subject to dissolution: business (or firm) norms 
displace professional ones. 
Cohen also knew “thinking like a lawyer” to be an aspect of 
professional identity that created “we lawyers.”188  Our findings here, 
consistent with what we found previously,189 suggest that lawyers, 
even those who occupy the same position within companies, are too 
diverse to produce strong results when analyzed as a group.  Lawyers 
are not a “we” who can be organized toward particular ends or whose 
 
 183. See id. at 73. 
 184. See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 518. 
 185. See id. at 501. 
 186. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 189. See generally Parker et al., supra note 175, at 238–41. 
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individual moral character can be ignored.  We do not find a shared 
vision of to whom a company answers or what should be a company’s 
attitude towards complying with the law. 
Lawyers as a collective can also mobilize to claim the right to solve 
problems, to occupy certain positions, and to make jurisdictional 
claims.  Lawyers might be able to argue that they should be the ones 
to teach company managers what regulation requires and what 
compliance entails.  We find no evidence that lawyers are mobilizing 
to gain compliance jobs.  Our data finds that only 18% of those in 
charge of compliance were lawyers.  Despite the tight relation 
between compliance and legal regulation and the hoped for relation 
between legal controls and social reform, lawyers may not be more 
suitable than others to lead compliance departments.  Despite the 
need of young lawyers, at least, to find non-distinctively legal jobs as 
traditional legal jobs face closure, lawyers claim no special ability to 
diagnose, analyze, or remedy compliance issues. 
Our findings are consistent with a lawyer cast of mind developing 
particularly well an individual’s communication skills.  According to 
our data, when a company employs someone with a legal background 
as manager of compliance, it is buying training manuals, educational 
programs, and warnings about the prospect of legal sanction.  This is 
consistent with a prior study of individuals who took their legal 
degrees and went into management, who report that law school 
served them well by developing their communication skills.190  Legal 
writing and oral advocacy are traditional lawyer skills and lawyers 
take these into compliance when they write manuals and train 
employees. 
Generally, however, we find a lack of evidence of the influence of a 
lawyer cast of mind in compliance management.  To conclude with 
just one area where having a lawyer in charge of compliance appears 
to make no difference: there is no evidence that employing a lawyer 
to be in charge of compliance leads to increased hot lines and other 
whistle-blowing possibilities.  Lawyers are still not involved in 
“mending the information net.”191  Lawyers still do not see their job as 
improving decision-making.192  The ball is still in the business 
manager’s court, to decide how to play the game after receiving the 
 
 190. Robert Eli Rosen, Educating Law Students to be Business Leaders, 9 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 27 (2002). 
 191. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: LAW AND ETHICS 199 
(1975). 
 192. See generally Rosen, supra note 18. 
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lawyers’ manuals and sitting through the seminars offered by the 
lawyers. 
Cohen’s idealization of the profession is not unique.  Many have 
valued professions as a cultural tradition that permits new ideas and 
skills to emerge and mature.193  The ability of professions to enter 
situations and remake them, bringing the weight of culture and a 
profound skill set, has often been lauded—not least by the 
professions themselves, who have an economic project sustained by 
such beliefs.194  Unfortunately, we find little evidence here.  Perhaps 
the professions have decided to keep their hands off compliance, 
which can be an area in which one can get burnt when non-
compliance is discovered. 
According to one view, sociology cannot determine what is ethical.  
The empirical and the normative should be kept separate.  
Nonetheless, research such as undertaken here “may give us a 
‘general orientation’ . . . in the light of which certain ways of looking 
at ethics become more plausible than others.”195  If we had found 
individuals acting in a role-differentiated way, then it becomes more 
plausible to think of developing ethics in such a way.  If we had found 
the lawyer cast of mind in a strong sense, then it would make sense to 
consider what the law of lawyering regarding compliance and 
compliance systems should be.  On the contrary, given our results, it 
is more plausible to speak of professional ethics as only a species of 
general ethics.  The quality of the compliance manager and what she 
accomplishes appears from our results to stem not from her 
profession, but rather from her ethical character.  This is not the 
result Julius Henry Cohen would have imagined or desired.  Yet he 
has a comeback: these individuals have forsaken their profession for 
business. 
As we have argued, many, including Julius Henry Cohen, have 
assumed that there is a lawyer cast of mind, without demonstrating its 
existence.  We hope our negative findings spur others to be explicit 
about the parameters and consequences of socialization by legal 
education and practice experiences.  We hope our negative findings 
 
 193. DOROTHY EMMET, ROLES, RULES AND RELATIONS 158 (1966) (citing Talcott 
Parsons); PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION 121 (1957).  For a critical discussion of this tradition in the 
commercial law context, see Christine Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global 
Capital, and the Sociological Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347 (2012). 
 194. MAGALI SAFRATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A 
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1997). 
 195. EMMET, supra note 193, at 4. 
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spur lawyers who come to lead compliance programs to do more than 
merely write manuals and lecture to employees, perhaps instead 
leading the company to substantively value compliance with the law. 
 
